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I INTRODUCTION 
Typical consequences of child sexual abuse, particularly post-traumatic stress 
disorder (‘PTSD’), prevent many survivors of this abuse bringing civil legal 
proceedings within the statutory time limit. On discovering the nature and extent 
of their psychiatric injury, or its connection with the abuse, survivors may apply 
to the court for an extension of time to allow their claim to proceed. Outcomes of 
these applications often turn on judgments about the survivor’s knowledge of the 
injury and its cause, and about whether the survivor has taken reasonable steps to 
discover the nature, extent and cause of their injuries.  
Reported cases of applications for extensions of time in this context are rare, 
but Queensland has an emerging body of decisions. These cases demonstrate that 
judgments about the issues of knowledge and reasonable conduct are made 
without considering evidence about the symptomatology of PTSD, especially the 
avoidance criterion. This article summarises the consequences of child sexual 
abuse, focussing on PTSD, before outlining the statutory provisions for 
extensions of time. Case studies of applications by survivors with PTSD to 
extend time are then synthesised. The psychological evidence is used as a 
standard against which to analyse judicial reasoning about survivors’ knowledge 
and ‘reasonable’ conduct. Finally, the question of whether PTSD can constitute a 
legal disability in the context of an application for an extension of time is 
addressed. Because similar questions are raised by extension provisions in nearly 
all Australian jurisdictions, the analysis in this article has implications for future 
cases in both Queensland and other jurisdictions. 
 
II TYPICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
The typical child sex offender is male, and is a family member or relative of 
the child, or is otherwise known to the child. The majority of victims suffer 
numerous abusive acts, which commonly occur over a period of months or 
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years.1 In many cases, particularly when the abuser is known, a child will make 
no complaint about the abuse,2 for one or more of several reasons: being sworn to 
secrecy; compulsion by threats; imposed conviction of the normalness of the 
acts; imposed or misplaced feelings of responsibility for the acts; fear of family 
dissolution; fear of punishment of the wrongdoer; misplaced shame and guilt; 
and self-blame.3 Rather than disclosing the abuse, a child is likely to develop 
coping strategies.4 
 
A Psychological Injury: Short-Term and Long-Term 
Immediate and short-term consequences for a child who is being, or has been, 
sexually abused commonly include PTSD,5 anxiety,6 depression,7 low self-
esteem,8 inappropriate sexualised behaviour9 and difficulty in peer 
                                                 
1 Michael Dunne and Margot Legosz, ‘The Consequences of Childhood Sexual Abuse’ in Queensland 
Crime Commission and Queensland Police Service, Project AXIS Vol 4 – Child Sexual Abuse in 
Queensland: Selected Research and Papers (2000) 43, 47–55, <http://www.cmc.qld.gov.au/library/ 
CMCWEBSITE/AxisPapers.pdf> at 29 October 2004; David Finkelhor, Child Sexual Abuse: New Theory 
and Research (1984); David Finkelhor, ‘Current Information on the Scope and Nature of Child Sexual 
Abuse’ (1994) 4 Future of Children 4, 31; Beverly Gomes-Schwartz, Jonathan Horowitz and Albert 
Cardarelli, Child Sexual Abuse: The Initial Effects (1990). 
2 Ronald Summit, ‘The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome’ (1983) 7 Child Abuse and Neglect 
177. 
3 Queensland Crime Commission and Queensland Police Service, Project AXIS Vol 1 – Child Sexual Abuse 
in Queensland: The Nature and Extent (2000) 83–7, <http://www.cmc.qld.gov.au/library/CMC 
WEBSITE/AxisV1.pdf> at 29 October 2004. 
4 Summit, above n 2. 
5 Susan McLeer et al, ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Sexually Abused Children’ (1988) 27 Journal of 
the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 650; Esther Deblinger et al, ‘Post-Traumatic 
Stress in Sexually Abused, Physically Abused, and Nonabused Children’ (1989) 13 Child Abuse and 
Neglect 403; Susan McLeer et al, ‘Sexually Abused Children at High Risk for Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder’ (1992) 31 Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 875; Susan 
McLeer et al, ‘Psychiatric Disorders in Sexually Abused Children’ (1994) 33 Journal of the American 
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 313; David Wolfe, Louise Sas and Christine Wekerle, 
‘Factors Associated with the Development of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder among Child Victims of 
Sexual Abuse’ (1994) 18 Child Abuse and Neglect 37; Sue Boney-McCoy and David Finkelhor, ‘Prior 
Victimization: A Risk Factor for Child Sexual Abuse and for PTSD-Related Symptomatology among 
Sexually Abused Youth’ (1995) 19 Child Abuse and Neglect 1401; Peggy Ackerman et al, ‘Prevalence of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Other Psychiatric Diagnoses in Three Groups of Abused Children 
(Sexual, Physical, and Both)’ (1998) 22 Child Abuse and Neglect 759; Susan McLeer et al, 
‘Psychopathology in Non-Clinically Referred Sexually Abused Children’ (1998) 37 Journal of the 
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 1326; Judith Trowell et al, ‘Behavioural 
Psychopathology of Child Sexual Abuse in Schoolgirls Referred to a Tertiary Centre: A North London 
Study’ (1999) 8 European Journal of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 107; Allison Dubner and Robert 
Motta, ‘Sexually and Physically Abused Foster Care Children and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder’ (1999) 
67 Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 367. 
6 Lucy Berliner and Diana Elliott, ‘Sexual Abuse of Children’ in John Briere et al (eds), American 
Professional Society on the Abuse of Children Handbook on Child Maltreatment (1996) 51. 
7 Theresa Wozencraft, William Wagner and Alicia Pellegrin, ‘Depression and Suicidal Ideation in Sexually 
Abused Children’ (1991) 15 Child Abuse and Neglect 505. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Jon McClellan et al, ‘Age of Onset of Sexual Abuse: Relationship to Sexually Inappropriate Behaviours’ 
(1996) 35 Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 1375. 
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relationships.10 Adolescents are likely to experience even higher levels of 
depression and anxiety than younger children because of their greater cognitive 
understanding of their abuse.11 Adolescents may also be more susceptible than 
younger children to self-harm and suicidal ideation and behaviour.12 Substance 
abuse and running away from home are also more frequent in adolescents than 
younger children.13 Low self-esteem continues throughout adolescence.14  
In the long-term, the adult survivor of child sexual abuse typically has PTSD, 
or depression, or both.15 Classical sequelae also include anxiety, shame, distrust, 
                                                 
10 Anthony Mannarino, Judith Cohen and Susan Berman, ‘The Children’s Attributions and Perceptions 
Scale: A New Measure of Sexual Abuse-Related Factors’ (1994) 23 Journal of Clinical Child Psychology 
204.  
11 Christine Gidycz and Mary Koss, ‘The Impact of Adolescent Sexual Victimization: Standardized 
Measures of Anxiety, Depression and Behavioural Deviancy’ (1989) 4 Violence and Victims 139. 
12 Cheryl Lanktree, John Briere and Lisa Zaidi, ‘Incidence and Impact of Sexual Abuse in a Child 
Outpatient Sample: The Role of Direct Inquiry’ (1991) 15 Child Abuse and Neglect 447; Beth Molnar, 
Lisa Berkman and Stephen Buka, ‘Psychopathology, Childhood Sexual Abuse and Other Childhood 
Adversities: Relative Links to Subsequent Suicidal Behaviour in the US’ (2001) 31 Psychological 
Medicine 965; Graham Martin et al, ‘Sexual Abuse and Suicidality: Gender Differences in a Large 
Community Sample of Adolescents’ (2004) 28 Child Abuse and Neglect 491. 
13 Mary Rotherham-Borus et al, ‘Sexual Abuse History and Associated Multiple Risk Behaviour in 
Adolescent Runaways’ (1996) 66 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 390. 
14 Wozencraft, Wagner and Pellegrin, above n 7. 
15 The claim made in this article is that PTSD occurs with sufficient frequency in adult survivors of child 
sexual abuse, especially but not limited to when the abuse is severe (entailing penetration) and of long 
duration, to demand consideration by legislatures in enacting limitation periods for this class of case, and 
to warrant adequate consideration by courts in determining reasonable conduct by survivors of abuse who 
seek an extension of time in which to institute civil litigation. A review of the literature reveals a growing 
body of evidence of the incidence of PTSD in adult survivors of child sexual abuse. Although PTSD is 
not an inevitable consequence of child sexual abuse, even when that abuse is severe and of long duration, 
studies of survivors of child sexual abuse have shown high rates of PTSD. A study of 117 survivors 
found that 86 per cent met full Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (‘DSM’) criteria for lifetime PTSD: 
Ned Rodriguez et al, ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in a Clinical Sample of Adult Survivors of 
Childhood Sexual Abuse’ (1996) 20 Child Abuse and Neglect 943. Another study of 42 survivors showed 
that 69 per cent met the DSM criteria: Anderson Rowan et al, ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in a 
Clinical Sample of Adults Sexually Abused as Children‘ (1994) 18 Child Abuse and Neglect 51. Another 
study of 45 survivors yielded an incidence of 86 per cent: Ned Rodriguez et al, ‘Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder in Adult Female Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse: A Comparison Study’ (1997) 65 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 53. See also Frederick Lindberg and Lois Distad, ‘Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorders in Women Who Experienced Childhood Incest’ (1985) 9 Child Abuse and 
Neglect 329; Angela Browne and David Finkelhor, ‘Initial and Long Term Effects: A Review of the 
Research’ in David Finkelhor (ed), A Sourcebook on Child Sexual Abuse (1986) 158; Paul Mullen, 
‘Impact of Sexual and Physical Abuse on Women’s Mental Health’, The Lancet, 16 April 1988, 841; 
Judith Stein et al, ‘Long-Term Psychological Sequelae of Child Sexual Abuse’ (1988) 27 Journal of the 
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 650; Paul Mullen et al, ‘Childhood Sexual Abuse 
and Mental Health in Adult Life’ (1993) 163 British Journal of Psychiatry 721; Amy Silverman, Helen 
Reinherz and Rose Giaconia, ‘The Long-Term Sequelae of Child and Adolescent Abuse: A Longitudinal 
Community Study’ (1996) 20 Child Abuse and Neglect 709; Lynne Briggs and Peter Joyce, ‘What 
Determines Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Symptomatology for Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse?’ 
(1997) 21 Child Abuse and Neglect 575; Cathy Widom, ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Abused and 
Neglected Children Grown Up’ (1999) 156 American Journal of Psychiatry 1223; Dawn Johnson, Julie 
Pike and Kathleen Chard, ‘Factors Predicting PTSD, Depression, and Dissociative Severity in Female 
Treatment-Seeking Childhood Sexual Abuse Survivors’ (2001) 25 Child Abuse and Neglect 179; Caron 
Zlotnick, Jill Mattia and Mark Zimmerman, ‘Clinical Features of Survivors of Sexual Abuse with Major 
Depression’ (2001) 25 Child Abuse and Neglect 357; Allan Horowitz et al,  
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anger, guilt, low self-esteem, and self-destructive behaviour such as alcoholism 
and other substance abuse.16 Relationships with other adults are affected due to a 
negative self-concept and survivors frequently have difficulty navigating adult 
sexual and non-sexual relationships.17 
 
B PTSD 
1 Avoidance of Complaint and Litigation 
PTSD, as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders,18 has several criteria, three of which are particularly relevant to this 
discussion.19 First, PTSD involves the existence of an unusually traumatic event 
which involved actual or threatened death or serious physical injury, and in 
which the patient felt intense fear, horror or helplessness (‘the stressor criterion’). 
Second, the patient repeatedly relives the event in one or more ways including 
recollections, dreams, flashbacks, distressed responses to cues symbolising the 
event, and physiological reactions to these cues (‘the intrusive recollection 
criterion’). Third, and most significantly in the legal context, the patient 
persistently avoids trauma-related stimuli, and has numbed general 
responsiveness, as shown by three or more factors, including: avoiding thoughts, 
feelings or conversations concerned with the event; avoiding activities, people or 
places that recall the event; and an inability to remember an important feature of 
the event (‘the avoidance criterion’).20 
Beyond the difficulties of disclosing the abuse at the time it occurs, the 
avoidance response means that many adult survivors of child sexual abuse21 will 
need a significant period of time to develop the capacity to make even a 
confidential disclosure of the abuse, or a tentative foray into psychological 
                                                                                                                         
 ‘The Impact of Childhood Abuse and Neglect on Adult Mental Health: A Prospective Study’ (2001) 42 
Journal of Health and Social Behaviour 184; Harriet MacMillan et al, ‘Childhood Abuse and Lifetime 
Psychopathology in a Community Sample’ (2001) 158 American Journal of Psychiatry 1878; Gina 
Owens and Kathleen Chard, ‘Comorbidity and Psychiatric Diagnoses among Women Reporting Child 
Sexual Abuse’ (2003) 27 Child Abuse and Neglect 1075; Josie Spataro et al, ‘Impact of Child Sexual 
Abuse on Mental Health: Prospective Study in Males and Females’ (2004) 184 British Journal of 
Psychiatry 416; Dawn Peleikis, Arnstein Mykletun and Alv Dahl, ‘The Relative Influence of Childhood 
Sexual Abuse and Other Family Background Risk Factors on Adult Adversities in Female Outpatients 
Treated for Anxiety Disorders and Depression’ (2004) 28 Child Abuse and Neglect 61. 
16 Mullen et al, ‘Childhood Sexual Abuse and Mental Health in Adult Life’, above n 15. 
17 Paul Mullen et al, ‘The Effect of Child Sexual Abuse on Social, Interpersonal and Sexual Function in 
Adult Life’ (1994) 165 British Journal of Psychiatry 35; Jonathan Hill et al, ‘Child Sexual Abuse, Poor 
Parental Care and Adult Depression: Evidence for Different Mechanisms’ (2001) 179 British Journal of 
Psychiatry 104; Stein et al, above n 15. 
18 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th revised ed, 
2000). 
19 The other criteria concern hyper-arousal (D), duration (E) (the symptoms must persist for three months or 
more to be chronic PTSD) and functional significance (F): ibid 468. 
20 Ibid 463–4, 468. Symptoms can have delayed onset, appearing more than six months after the event. In 
children, response to the event may be agitation or disorganised behaviour, and young children may relive 
the event through repetitive play, re-enactment or nightmares: at 466. 
21 Although this article is limited to adult survivors of child sexual abuse, it may also be that since PTSD 
can result from extreme physical abuse inflicted on a child that there are a significant number of adult 
survivors of such physical abuse to whom the arguments in this article apply equally: see generally D 
Pelcovitz et al, ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Physically Abused Adolescents’ (1994) 33 Journal of 
the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 305. 
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counselling. Many survivors will never be able to disclose the abuse. Whether a 
survivor silently suffered the abuse as a child and takes many years to disclose it 
as an adult, or whether a survivor complained initially but was ignored or 
punished, or whether a survivor had his or her complaint received but still 
suffered the typical consequences of the abuse, many adult survivors who 
eventually desire civil legal remedies will not be psychologically ready to pursue 
the perpetrator through the courts until some time into their 20s, 30s or even 40s. 
Statistics on disclosure, let alone readiness to pursue litigation, demonstrate this 
beyond doubt.22 
It is therefore a normal and reasonable response by adult survivors of child 
sexual abuse with PTSD to avoid any activity – including legal action – that 
would require detailed reliving and description of the events, adversarial testing 
of their account of those events, and confrontation of the perpetrator. The 
symptoms of PTSD mean that, of those survivors who ever become able to take 
legal action, most require an extended period of time in which to gain knowledge 
of the facts required by law to institute civil proceedings for compensation. These 
facts include those of the personal injury, of the injuries’ nature and extent, and 
of the causal connection between the perpetrator’s abuse and those injuries. 
Awareness of relevant facts is one thing; the survivor must then have resolved 
their PTSD symptoms to a sufficient degree to be able to institute civil legal 
proceedings. Thus, with statutory provisions that give a wronged party only a 
short period of time in which to institute civil action, PTSD is often an 
insurmountable barrier to adult survivors of child sexual abuse seeking access to 
the courts for civil compensation. Before turning to these provisions, it is 
necessary to comment briefly upon the legal implications of recently emerged 
psychological evidence of PTSD. 
 
2 The Significance of New Evidence 
PTSD was first recognised in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders in 1980.23 The youth of PTSD alone is significant, 
but when this is added to the recency of medical and social recognition of the 
incidence, prevalence and consequences of child sexual abuse, the difficulties 
that can be produced by outdated legal principles start to become obvious. The 
consequences of child sexual abuse, including PTSD, only became known to the 
psychiatric and psychological communities (much less to broader society, the 
legal community and survivors of abuse) in the late 1980s and 1990s. The 
recency of this evidence is significant when assessing the justifiability of 
statutory time limits, and of judicial expectations about survivors’ knowledge of 
the nature, extent and cause of their injuries, and about what survivors could 
reasonably have done to discover this knowledge. 
                                                 
22 In Queensland, the Project AXIS survey found that of 212 adult survivors, 25 took 5–9 years to disclose 
it, 33 took 10–19 years, and 51 took over 20 years: Queensland Crime Commission and Queensland 
Police Service, Project AXIS Vol 1, above n 3, 84 (Table 23). Where the perpetrator is a relative, it is even 
more likely that the delay will be long. A Criminal Justice Commission analysis of Queensland Police 
Service data from 1994–98 found that, of 3721 reported offences committed by relatives, 25.5 per cent of 
survivors took 1–5 years to report the acts, 9.7 per cent took 5–10 years, 18.2 per cent took 10–20 years 
and 14.2 per cent took more than 20 years: at 86 (Table 25). 
23 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd ed, 1980). 
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Given that statute and common law in this area was developed in a social 
context without the benefit of recent knowledge about child sexual abuse, those 
laws are likely to produce results that can now be identified as unjustifiable, but 
were perhaps understandable in the previous social context. Now that the 
incidence, extent and consequences of child sexual abuse are known, the failure 
of contemporary parliaments to change the law to reflect this new knowledge, 
and the unwillingness of judges to be informed by it, produces gaps in the law 
and unjust results which are inexcusable.  
This problem is illustrated by the failure of the Queensland Parliament to 
respond to new evidence, and the apparently insufficiently informed nature of 
judicial reasoning in this area. This is an issue requiring attention, particularly 
given the significant numbers of children in Queensland who are sexually 
abused. Between 1994 and 1998, there were 15 774 child sex offences reported 
to Queensland Police.24 In 2002–03, there were 31 068 notifications of child 
abuse and neglect to State authorities, involving 22 027 children.25 Of these, 
there were 12 203 substantiated cases involving 9032 children.26 Of the 12 203 
substantiations, 610 were cases of sexual abuse.27 Queensland also has a history 
of child sexual abuse in State and religious institutions, and in State foster care.28 
 
 
 
III STATUTORY LIMITATION PERIODS 
A Time Limits and Minority 
1 General Application 
The state is not limited by time in prosecuting indictable criminal offences, 
which include the acts constituting child sexual abuse.29 The High Court has held 
that individuals accused of criminal acts have no right to a speedy trial, or even to 
                                                 
24 Queensland Crime Commission and Queensland Police Service, Project AXIS Vol 1, above n 3, 32 (Table 
3). The incidence of child sexual abuse is notoriously difficult to assess due to the low rate of reports. It is 
sufficient to state that the reported number of offences represents only a proportion of the actual number 
of incidents. 
25 Susie Kelly and Melinda Hecker, Child Protection Australia 2002–03, Child Welfare Series Paper No 34, 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2004) 17 (Table 2.6), <http://www.aihw.gov.au/ 
publications/cws/cpa02-03/cpa02-03.pdf> at 29 October 2004. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid 16 (Table 2.5). The 12 203 substantiations comprised 2806 of physical abuse, 610 of sexual abuse, 
4135 of emotional abuse and 4652 of neglect. 
28 Two inquiries have found appalling records of abuse and neglect of children in State care: Queensland, 
Forde Commission of Inquiry into Abuse of Children in Queensland Institutions, Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into Abuse of Children in Queensland Institutions (1999), <http://www.families. 
qld.gov.au/department/forde/publications/documents/pdf/forde_comminquiry.pdf> at 29 October 2004; 
Crime and Misconduct Commission, Protecting Children: An Inquiry into Abuse of Children in Foster 
Care (2004), <http://www.cmc.qld.gov.au/library/CMCWEBSITE/ProtectingChildren.pdf> at 29 October 
2004. 
29 Criminal Code (Qld) ss 349 (rape), 208 (unlawful sodomy), 210 (indecent treatment of a child under 16), 
215 (carnal knowledge with or of a child under 16), 222 (incest), 229B (maintaining a sexual relationship 
with a child). 
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trial within a reasonable time.30 Cases of delayed prosecution for child sexual 
abuse demonstrate that it is possible for a fair trial to be secured many years after 
the relevant events.31 As well, judges in criminal courts have accepted that many 
survivors of child sexual abuse, for good reasons, take a long time to report it. In 
1995, for example, Wilcox J stated: 
It is commonplace for there to be a substantial delay in the reporting of alleged 
sexual assaults, especially where the complainant is a child … [M]any sexual 
assault victims are unable to voice their experience for a very long time. To adopt a 
rule that delay simpliciter justifies a stay of criminal proceedings would be to 
exclude many offences, particularly offences against children, from the sanctions of 
the criminal law.32 
The civil context provides a marked contrast. Statutes set time limits on when 
a person can bring a civil claim for personal injuries, for several, usually 
justifiable, reasons. It is necessary to ensure a fair trial for the defendant by 
ensuring the availability of fresh evidence. People need to be able to proceed 
with their lives unencumbered by the threat of an old claim. Plaintiffs should not 
sleep on their rights. The public has an interest in the prompt resolution of 
disputes.33 Accordingly, in all Australian States and Territories, bar Western 
Australia, actions seeking damages for personal injuries must generally be 
commenced within three years from the date on which the cause of action arose.34 
Minority has traditionally constituted a legal disability and has stopped time 
from running until the attainment of majority. In most, but not all, Australian 
                                                 
30 Jago v District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23. Recognition that delay may impede a fair 
trial remains and courts have, though rarely, stayed proceedings: see Gill v DPP (NSW) (1992) 64 A Crim 
R 82; R v Davis (1995) 57 FCR 152.  
31 See, eg, R v Birdsall (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Court of Criminal Appeal, Cole 
JA, Grove and Simpson JJ, 3 March 1997), involving acts allegedly committed between 1961 and 1967, 
with the report occurring in 1995; R v Dodds [1996] QCA 402 (Unreported, Fitzgerald P, Pincus JA and 
Lee J, 18 October 1996), involving acts allegedly committed between 1984 and 1986, with proceedings 
instituted in 1994.  
32 R v Lane (Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Wilcox J, 19 June 1995) 2. See also R v Austin (1995) 
14 WAR 484 (where Owen J states: ‘It is not at all uncommon for there to be a delay in the institution of 
proceedings for sexual offences’: at 493); R v Davis (1995) 57 FCR 152. 
33 Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, 551 ff. 
34 Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 11; Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 18A(2), 50C; Limitation of 
Actions Act 1958 (Vic) ss 5(1AA), 27D(1)(a); Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 36; Limitation Act 
1974 (Tas) s 5(1); Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) s 16B; Limitation Act 1981 (NT) s 12(1)(b). The Limitation 
Act 1935 (WA) s 38(1)(b) sets a time limit of four years for actions for trespass to the person, assault and 
battery, and s 38(1)(c)(vi) sets a period of six years for negligence. In Wilson v Horne (1999) 8 Tas R 
363, it was held that an action exists in both negligence and trespass for the acts constituting  
 child sexual abuse. This can therefore bring different limitation periods into play, depending on the 
jurisdiction. An application for special leave to appeal this decision was refused: Wilson v Horne (1999) 
19 Leg Rep SL4a. Note also that, in New South Wales and Victoria, actions brought concerning injury 
sustained after the amendments in those jurisdictions have time running from the date of discoverability 
rather than from when the cause of action accrued: Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50C; Limitation of 
Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27D. 
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jurisdictions, this effect of minority is still generally upheld:35 Thus, in 
Queensland, South Australia, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital 
Territory, a survivor of child sexual abuse has three years from turning 18 in 
which to institute proceedings. In Tasmania, a survivor has until the age of 21, 
but only if he or she was not in the custody of a parent at the time of the events, 
and in Western Australia, a survivor will have until 22 or 24 depending on the 
action. In New South Wales and Victoria, however, where a child suffers injury 
from someone who is not a parent or a close associate of a parent, amendments 
motivated by the Commonwealth’s Review of the Law of Negligence36 (‘Ipp 
Report’) establish a different position. In these States, if the child is in the 
custody of a capable parent or guardian, then that child is deemed not to be under 
a legal disability or incapacity, and the child’s parent or guardian is required to 
bring the action on the child’s behalf within a set period of time, which may 
often be a much shorter period than exists even in other Australian jurisdictions.37 
In New South Wales, the action must be brought within three years from when 
the action is discoverable, while in Victoria the action must be brought within six 
years from this time.38 In both cases, a long-stop of 12 years from the date of the 
wrongful acts applies.39 
 
2 Qualitative Differences in Child Abuse Cases 
As discussed above, there is no doubt that the legal system must protect the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial. However, judicial and extra-judicial 
commentators have shown that qualitative differences in child abuse cases (in 
contrast to typical personal injury suits, such as motor accident cases) outweigh 
the generally good reasons for a short standard time period.40 These differences 
flow primarily from the following facts: that the injury is inflicted on a child; that 
                                                 
35 Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) ss 5(2), 11, 29(2)(c). See also Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 
45; Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) ss 2(2), 26; Limitation Act 1935 (WA) s 40; Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) ss 
8(3), 30; Limitation Act 1981 (NT) ss 4(1), 36. Under the Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 26(6), however, 
time is not suspended in cases of personal injury to a child through negligence, nuisance or breach of 
duty, if the child was in the custody of a parent. The phrase ‘breach of duty’ has been held by the 
Victorian Court of Appeal to include acts of intentional trespass: Mason v Mason [1997] 1 VR 325, 330. 
This means that the exclusion of the suspension operates whether the action is brought in trespass or 
negligence. 
36 Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report (2002), <http://revofneg. 
treasury.gov.au/content/Report2/PDF/Law_Neg_Final.pdf> at 29 October 2004. 
37 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50F(2)(a); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27J(1)(a). These 
provisions promote recommendations made by the Ipp Report: see Ipp Report, above n 36, 95–6. 
38 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 50C(1), 50F; Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) ss 27J, 27E. 
39 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50C(1)(b); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27E(2)(b). 
Discoverability in these cases is sheeted home to the child’s parent or guardian: Limitation Act 1969 
(NSW) s 50F(3); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27J(3). 
40 See, eg, W v A-G [1999] 2 NZLR 709, 729–30 (Thomas J); Carter v Corporation of the Sisters of Mercy 
of the Diocese of Rockhampton [2001] QCA 335 (Unreported, McPherson JA, Muir and Atkinson JJ, 24 
August 2001) [98] (Atkinson J). See also M (K) v M (H) [1992] 3 SCR 6; Stubbings v United Kingdom 
(1996) IV Eur Court HR 1487, 1503–4 (obiter dicta); Ben Mathews, ‘Limitation Periods and Child Sexual 
Abuse Cases: Law, Psychology, Time and Justice’ (2003) 11 Torts Law Journal 218, 230 ff; Annette 
Marfording, ‘Access to Justice for Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse’ (1997) 5 Torts Law Journal 221; 
Leanne Bunney, ‘Limitation of Actions: Effect on Child Sexual Abuse Survivors in Queensland’ (1998) 
18 Queensland Lawyer 128; Janet Mosher, ‘Challenging Limitation Periods: Civil Claims by Adult 
Survivors of Incest’ (1994) 44 University of Toronto Law Journal 169, 176–81. 
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the acts occur in private and so are not often accompanied by objective 
evidence; that the acts are particularly egregious; that the psychological effects of 
the abuse commonly take many years or even decades to manifest; that the causal 
connection between abuse and injury also typically takes a long period of time to 
be realised; that the nature and extent of the injuries take a similarly long period 
of time to be diagnosed; that the victim’s frequent misplaced sense of guilt, 
shame and responsibility for the acts impedes their realisation of being the victim 
of a wrong; and that the wrongdoer’s position of superiority often deters 
survivors from proceeding until they feel psychologically equipped to do so.41  
Even the Ipp Report, whose terms of reference were to examine methods to 
reform the common law to limit liability and quantum of damages, recognised the 
unjustifiable difficulties posed by a short and rigid limitation period in at least 
some classes of child injury, namely where a child is injured by a parent or a 
close associate of a parent.42 Responding to the recommendations of the Ipp 
Report, legislatures in New South Wales and Victoria enacted a special limitation 
period for these cases.43 In these cases, the action is deemed to be discoverable 
by the victim when he or she turns 25 years of age, or when the cause of action is 
actually discoverable (not constructively discoverable), whichever is later. With 
the long-stop period of 12 years applying to these cases as well, this means that 
in this class of case, a plaintiff who has turned 25 has three years to institute 
proceedings once he or she has actual knowledge of the fact of the injury, of the 
defendant causing that injury, and of the injury being of sufficient seriousness 
that it justifies legal action. Effectively then, a plaintiff here can have until 
turning 37 to institute proceedings. 
Despite cogent arguments that the rationales for strict time limits are 
outweighed by countervailing factors in cases of child abuse, and despite the fact 
that, in response to these arguments, overseas jurisdictions have amended their 
statutes of limitation for these cases,44 in Australian jurisdictions, these actions 
are treated no differently, save the specific classes of case now recognised in 
New South Wales and Victoria. The significance of this is that most adult 
                                                 
41 For a more detailed explanation, see Mathews, above n 40. 
42 Ipp Report, above n 36, 96–7. 
43 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50E; Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27I. A ‘close associate of a 
parent or guardian’ is defined as a person whose relationship with the parent is such that the parent or 
guardian might be influenced not to proceed, or if the victim might be unwilling to disclose to the parent 
or guardian the events causing the personal injury: Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50E(2); Limitation of 
Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27I(2). 
44 British Columbia, Manitoba, Newfoundland, the Northwest Territories, Nova Scotia, Nunavut, Ontario, 
Saskatchewan and the Yukon have abolished time limits for civil actions based on sexual assault: 
Limitation Act, RSBC 1996, c 266, s 3(4)(k)(i); Limitation of Actions Act, CCSM 2002, c L-150, s 
2.1(2)(a), (b); Limitations Act, RSN 1995, c L-16.1, s 8(2); Limitation of Actions Act, RSNWT 1998, c L-
8, s 2.1(2); Limitation of Actions Act, RSNS 1989, c 258, s 2(5)(a), (b); Nunavut Act, SC 1993, c 28, s 29 
(which adopts the Northwest Territories provisions); Limitations Act, RSO 2002, c 24, s 10(1)–(3); 
Limitation of Actions Act, RSS 1978, c L-15, s 3(1)(3.1)(a); Limitation of Actions Act, RSY 2002, c 139, s 
2(3). In Manitoba, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Ontario, and Saskatchewan, the abolition of time 
limits extends to all actions for trespass to the person, assault or battery where at the time of the injury the 
person was in a relationship of financial, emotional, physical or other dependency with one of the parties 
who caused the injury: Limitation of Actions Act, CCSM 2002, c L-150, s 2.1(2)(b)(ii); Limitation of 
Actions Act, RSNWT 1998, c L-8, s 2.1(1)–(2) (adopted in Nunavut: Nunavut Act, SC 1993, c 28, s 29); 
Limitations Act, RSO 2002, c 24, s 10(1)–(3); Limitation of Actions Act, RSS 1978, c L-15, s 
3(1)(3.1)(b)(ii). 
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survivors of child sexual abuse with PTSD (and many of those who do not 
have PTSD) will not be able to commence proceedings within the time allowed. 
Unless the defendant does not plead the expiry of time as a defence – expiry of 
the time limit must be pleaded as a defence; it does not operate automatically to 
bar the plaintiff’s access to the court45 – these plaintiffs will be out of time. They 
are then forced to abandon their claim, or to argue that they were under a legal 
disability since attaining majority so that time has not run until that disability 
ceased,46 or to apply to the court for an extension of time in which to bring their 
claim. Due to the cost of such an application, many will not pursue the matter.47 
 
B Extension Provisions 
Most Australian jurisdictions have statutory provisions enabling time to be 
extended by the court, usually on the basis that critical facts about the injury 
(including the presence of the injury itself, as well as its cause) have only 
surfaced long after the wrongful event.48 Despite the technical availability of an 
extension, however, Queensland case law demonstrates that in child abuse cases 
the extension provisions have been almost impossible to satisfy. The discussion 
of Queensland decisions in Part III is instructive, not only for future Queensland 
cases, but also for extension applications in other Australian jurisdictions, given 
that extension provisions in these jurisdictions import considerations that are 
identical or similar to those that have proved decisive in Queensland. These 
comparative provisions will be summarised after outlining the Queensland 
provisions. 
In Queensland, assuming there is enough evidence to establish the action, an 
applicant is typically eligible for an extension of time if it is demonstrated to the 
court that a material fact of a decisive character relating to the action was neither 
known to the applicant, nor within the applicant’s means of knowledge, until a 
date after the applicant turned 20, and within one year of the applicant seeking 
the extension.49 ‘Material facts relating to a right of action’ include the fact of the 
occurrence of negligence or trespass; the fact that the negligence or trespass was 
capable of causing personal injury; the nature and extent of the injury; and the 
extent to which the injury was in fact caused by the negligence or trespass.50 A 
material fact will be of a decisive character if a reasonable person knowing that 
fact, and having taken appropriate advice, would regard it as showing (i) that an 
action would have a reasonable prospect of success and of resulting in an award 
of damages sufficient to justify bringing the action; and (ii) that the survivor of 
                                                 
45 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 150(1)(c). Nor will the court consider expiry of time on its 
own initiative: Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 498. 
46 For a discussion of the disability argument, see below Part VI. 
47 Submission 295 to Senate Community Affairs References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Forgotten 
Australians: A Report on Australians Who Experienced Institutional or Out-of-Home Care as Children 
(2004) (A Sdrinis) (copy on file with author). 
48 Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 31; Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 58, 60A, 60G, 62A, 62D; 
Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) ss 23A, 27K; Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 48; Limitation 
Act 1974 (Tas) s 5(3); Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) s 36; Limitation Act 1981 (NT) s 44. The Limitation 
Act 1935 (WA) has no general extension provision. 
49 Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 31(2). 
50 Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 30(1)(a). 
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the abuse ought, in their own interests and taking their own circumstances into 
account, to bring an action.51 
A pivotal provision deems a fact to be outside the applicant’s means of 
knowledge only if the applicant does not actually know of the fact, and, as far as 
the fact is discoverable, the applicant has taken all reasonable steps to discover it 
before it is actually discovered.52 The idea behind this provision is that even if a 
plaintiff could not have possessed the material facts and so have brought an 
action within time, that plaintiff is still expected, after time has expired, to take 
reasonable steps to ascertain those facts and institute proceedings quickly once 
their ascertainment is possible, in order to reduce the delay produced by 
otherwise unavoidable circumstances. Similar provisions in other jurisdictions 
contain, explicitly or implicitly, a requirement that the plaintiff take ‘reasonable 
steps’ to discover the decisive facts. 
In New South Wales, different extension provisions are available depending 
on the time when the injury was sustained, or where other reasons for an 
extension may exist. Several of these provisions require the court to consider the 
reasonableness of the applicant’s conduct in ascertaining the relevant facts. First, 
for extension applications concerning actions where a person was injured before 
1 September 1990, the substance of the Queensland provision discussed above, 
concerning whether a material fact of decisive character was not within the 
applicant’s means of knowledge, is implicitly duplicated.53 Second, for actions 
involving injury sustained between 1 September 1990 and 6 December 2002, 
when considering an application extension, the court must consider, among other 
things, the steps, if any, taken by the plaintiff to obtain medical, legal or other 
expert advice and the nature of any advice received.54 Third, the court must take 
into account the same considerations where a person applies for an extension of 
the 12 year long-stop in the case of an action concerning injury sustained after 6 
December 2002.55 More significantly, the long-stop cannot be extended beyond 
three years from the date of discoverability, which introduces the element of 
constructive discoverability, that is, when it can be deemed that a plaintiff 
‘ought’ to have known of the three decisive facts founding an action. A cause of 
action is discoverable on the first date the plaintiff knows or ought to know of 
three facts: the injury, the fact that the defendant caused that injury, and the fact 
that the injury is of sufficient seriousness to justify bringing an action. It is 
deemed that a person ought to know a fact at a particular time if the fact would 
have been ascertained by them had they taken all reasonable steps before that 
time to ascertain the fact.56 Fourth, for applications seeking an extension on the 
ground of recent manifestation of latent injury, the court may also have to 
consider when the plaintiff ought to have become aware of the facts of the injury, 
                                                 
51 Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 30(1)(b). 
52 Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 30(1)(c). 
53 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 58(2). 
54 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 60E(1)(g). 
55 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 62B(1)(e). 
56 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50D(2). 
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its nature and extent, and the connection between the injury and the 
defendant’s conduct.57 
In Victoria, the court must consider the extent to which the plaintiff acted 
promptly and reasonably once he or she knew the defendant’s act might be 
capable at that time of giving rise to an action for damages.58 The steps, if any, 
taken by the plaintiff to obtain medical, legal or other expert advice, and the 
nature of any advice received, must also be considered.59 In the Australian 
Capital Territory, the substance of the Victorian provision for this latter class of 
extension applications is duplicated.60 
In the three other jurisdictions, general discretionary powers enable the court 
to consider the plaintiff’s conduct. In South Australia, the court must consider the 
conduct of the parties generally, and any other relevant factors.61 In the Northern 
                                                 
57 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 60I(1)(b). See, eg, SD v Director-General of Community Welfare Services 
(Vic) (2001) 27 Fam LR 695 where this argument could have been raised by the defendants but was not. 
In this case, an extension of time was granted to three adult survivors of child abuse to proceed in 
negligence against government bodies. See also Johnson v Director of Community Services (Vic) [2000] 
Aust Torts Reports ¶81-540, where the application was refused at first instance, but on appeal was 
allowed. 
58 Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) ss 23A(3)(e), 27L(1)(f). Two Victorian cases are relevant here. In 
Calder v Uzelac [2003] VSCA 175 (Unreported, Ashley AJA, Buchanan and Chernov JJA, 14 November 
2003), the applicant alleged multiple sexual assaults by her brother in 1972 when she was aged 13. She 
consulted a psychologist in 2000, after her symptoms had progressively worsened from 1996 when she 
revisited her childhood home. The application was refused at first instance and on appeal. At first 
instance, the application was refused because the trial judge thought that the applicant had known of some 
of her symptoms for years, and that she could reasonably have been expected to consult medical experts 
to ascertain the precise nature and extent of her injuries before she actually did. On appeal, however, the 
refusal was based on the exercise of a residual discretion considering the risk of prejudice to the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial. The reason for this was that the Court found that it would no longer be 
possible to establish with sufficient certainty the causal effect of the sexual assaults on the plaintiff and 
the extent to which they caused her injuries (since she had suffered other adverse life influences). The 
Court, finding that the trial judge erred, accepted that it was not reasonable to expect the plaintiff to have 
taken steps before she did to ascertain the extent of her injuries. It could not be said that a plaintiff, who 
was aware of the symptoms of a psychological disorder, knew of, or ought to have ascertained, the fact 
that she was suffering from a psychological disorder. As well, the Court accepted that one acceptable 
reason that the plaintiff had not taken action before she did was that she felt a misplaced sense of shame, 
guilt and responsibility for the wrongdoer’s actions. 
In McGuinness v Clark (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, Duckett J, 7 May 2003), the plaintiff was 
granted an extension of time under the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 23A to pursue a civil claim 
for damages arising out of an alleged incident of rape by her cousin in 1981, when she was aged 17. The 
plaintiff had reported the rape to police within weeks; however, it was not until 2001 that she contacted 
her solicitor to proceed civilly. The Court accepted that, only after counselling in 2000 (by which time her 
psychological injuries had become more pronounced), did she believe that there was a causal  
 connection between the incident and her psychological injuries. When considering the issue of when the 
plaintiff knew her physical injury might be capable of giving rise to an action based on psychological 
injury, Duckett J considered her Indigenous background, limited schooling and work experience and 
onset of psychological problems and substance abuse, and concluded that the plaintiff had acted promptly 
for the purposes of s 23A. In contrast, the Court refused an application for an extension of time in relation 
to a second alleged incident in 1987. Regarding that matter, the plaintiff had approached solicitors days 
after the alleged event and, at that meeting, had referred to the 1981 event. The solicitors advised the 
plaintiff in writing that she could make a civil claim regarding the 1987 event. The Court concluded that 
the plaintiff decided not to proceed with that action and that this made the s 23A extension of time 
unavailable in this case. 
59 Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) ss 23A(f), 27L(1)(g). 
60 Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) s 36(3)(e), (f). 
61 Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 48(3b), (c), (d). 
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Territory, the court must consider, among other things, whether in all the 
circumstances it is just to grant the extension.62 In Tasmania, the court must 
consider whether it is just and reasonable to extend the limitation period.63 
Some final points need to be noted before turning to the case studies. Even if, 
in the relevant jurisdictions, all the conditions about recent discovery of decisive 
material facts and the taking of reasonable steps are satisfied, the court must still 
then consider the justice of extending time and exercise its discretion in the 
applicant’s favour. The applicant has a ‘positive burden’ of showing that justice 
requires the extension of time.64 Whether the court exercises its discretion to 
extend time depends on its estimation of the prejudice to the defendant’s right to 
a fair trial. This prejudice was the basis for the court’s refusal to extend time in 
the Victorian case of Calder v Uzelac.65 
The intention of the extension provision is therefore to enable the institution of 
proceedings by someone who could not reasonably have done so within the time 
allowed, either through lack of knowledge of a material fact (such as the injury 
sustained or its cause), or because on the facts then available, the action was 
likely to fail or to produce insignificant damages. In Re Sihvola, Wanstall CJ 
distilled the purpose like this: 
The issuing of a writ presupposes knowledge, or at least belief, by the plaintiff or 
his legal advisers that he can establish the cause of action alleged in his writ by  
proving the facts that are then within his knowledge. The antithesis of this 
proposition becomes the basic assumption of the scheme, ie, that he has not issued 
a writ because he lacked knowledge of some material fact, on proof of which his 
cause depended, either entirely or for a worthwhile result.66 
In Sugden v Crawford,67 Connolly J (with whom Shepherdson J agreed) stated 
that an extension will be justified where there is such an enhancement of the 
prospect of success as, for example, would raise it from a possibility to a real 
likelihood. Even if a prima facie case of negligence already existed, legal 
advisers may deem it too risky to bring an action until the newly discovered fact 
emerges. In Sugden v Crawford, the applicant succeeded because his originally 
undiagnosed back fractures, sustained after a workplace accident, were diagnosed 
after the expiry of time. The court found that without this later diagnosis, this 
was the type of undiagnosed complaint (soft tissue injury to the back) which 
without evidence of fracture, would be treated with scepticism and would be 
unlikely to attract a significant award of damages. The diagnosis, therefore, had 
the effect of transforming his case. It will be seen that this reasoning has 
particular relevance in cases of child abuse heard to date, due to the recency of 
social, medical and legal recognition of such abuse. 
                                                 
62 Limitation Act 1981 (NT) s 44(3). 
63 Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 5(3). 
64 Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 31(2) (imported by the phrase ‘the court may order that the period 
of limitation for the action be extended’): see Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 
186 CLR 541, 551, 554. This requirement is duplicated in other jurisdictions: see the provisions cited 
above n 48, which commonly refer to ‘the justice of the case’, or whether it is ‘just’ or ‘just and 
reasonable’ to extend time. 
65 [2003] VSCA 175 (Unreported, Buchanan and Chernov JJA and Ashley AJA, 14 November 2003). 
66 [1979] Qd R 458, 465. 
67 [1989] 1 Qd R 683, 686. 
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IV CASE STUDIES: APPLICATIONS TO EXTEND TIME 
A Woodhead v Elbourne 
The applicant in Woodhead v Elbourne68 was born on 25 February 1974. She 
suffered alleged sexual assaults between July 1981 and December 1987 (aged 7–
13), inflicted by a friend of her adoptive parents. The alleged assaults were of a 
relatively minor nature;69 the most serious incidents appeared to involve the 
defendant allegedly putting his hand ‘between the Plaintiff’s legs, in the area of 
her vagina’ and ‘mov[ing] his fingers over the Plaintiff’s vaginal area’.70 When 
aged 12 or 13 the plaintiff told her mother of the assaults and had counselling 
sessions and police interviews, but no action was taken. She had until 25 
February 1995 to begin proceedings. She instituted proceedings on 23 December 
1997 – a gap of two years and nine months from the expiry of the time limit. 
Relevantly, the claim was in assault and battery, not negligence, so the claim was 
actionable without proof of damage. 
 
1 Discovery of Material Facts 
The applicant suffered a crisis in November 1993 (aged 19) and saw a 
psychiatrist, who noted that the applicant had never been able to talk through or 
deal with the abuse, or explore how it had affected her. At this time, no analysis 
was conveyed to the applicant of her symptoms, their cause, or of the connection 
between the abuse and its consequences. Until this point she had not connected 
her symptoms with the abuse because, in her words as reported by a 
psychologist, ‘this would have meant confronting the trauma she was avoiding in 
the hope that it would just go away.’71 
Regular psychotherapy began in 1996. Towards the end of 1996, the applicant 
expressed anger at the assaults and the psychotherapist told her that she could see 
a lawyer. She consulted a solicitor on 26 March 1997, but was unable to provide 
details of her injury or condition except to say she was receiving counselling. 
That day, the psychotherapist told the applicant that she did not think that the 
applicant was ready for legal proceedings, and refused to provide a medico-legal 
report. 
The applicant began treatment with another psychiatrist on 19 January 1998. 
After six visits, this psychiatrist wrote a report on 18 December 1998, which 
included a diagnosis and comments linking the abuse with the conditions 
suffered by the applicant. The applicant said that only after reading this report 
did she  
                                                 
68 [2001] 1 Qd R 220. 
69 Using the table of severity of child maltreatment extracted from Kevin Browne and Michael Herbert, 
 Preventing Family Violence (1997), referred to in Kevin Browne, ‘Child Protection’ in Michael Rutter 
 and Eric Taylor (eds), Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (4th ed, 2003) 1158, 1162. 
70 Woodhead v Elbourne [2001] 1 Qd R 220, 222. 
71 Ibid 223. 
72 Ibid 225. 
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first bec[o]me aware that [she] was suffering from ‘post-traumatic stress disorder 
consequent upon childhood sexual abuse …’ and ‘borderline personality disorder’ 
… Before this time [she] did not know the nature of [her] condition, the extent of 
[her] condition or whether [her] condition related to the assaults by the defendant.72  
The respondent argued that direct knowledge of the material facts existed in 
1993, when the applicant began psychotherapy, or, alternatively, no later than 
1996. This argument was relied on to the exclusion of the argument usually 
raised in these cases that the applicant should have taken reasonable steps to 
discover the fact before she did. 
 
2 Judicial Reasoning 
Despite assault and battery being actionable without proof of damage, the 
extension was granted. The judicial reasoning is concerned with the applicant’s 
direct knowledge, and the effect of the psychiatric diagnosis. Unusually, there is 
no discussion of the reasonable steps issue. 
The first critical finding by White J was that only when the applicant read the 
December 1998 report did she have direct knowledge of the material facts which, 
if properly advised, would lead a reasonable person to institute proceedings. The 
knowledge gained at this time of the psychiatric diagnosis of the precise injury 
was held to raise the prospect of success from a possibility to a real likelihood by 
identifying the extent of the injury.73 Implicit here is the notion that without 
evidence of the extent of the injury, the applicant would have little chance of 
either success, or of a significant award of damages. 
Second, the fact that the applicant had explored the events over two years of 
psychotherapy was not deemed to be direct knowledge sufficient to dismiss the 
application. Justice White stated that during this time the applicant ‘may have 
been led to think that possibly the alleged sexual assaults were the cause of her 
symptoms’,74 but that was deemed insufficient to demonstrate direct knowledge 
of the material facts.  
Third, White J identified the applicant’s adverse life influences (the abuse, her 
school difficulties and problems with her brother). The psychiatric diagnosis was 
held to disentangle these influences and to clarify the causal consequences of 
particular experiences, including the causal link between the alleged abuse and 
the psychiatric injury.75 
This reasoning will be revisited during the analyses of the three cases which 
follow. It will be seen that the reasoning and conclusions of this decision are 
impossible to reconcile with the following decisions. However, one point all of 
the judgments have in common is that the effect of avoidance caused by PTSD is 
not discussed. 
                                                 
73 Ibid 227. 
74 Ibid. 
75 On the question of discretion and delay, White J held that there was no significant prejudice to the 
defendant. The plaintiff was entitled to bring her action until 25 February 1995, so there was no great 
delay (although the earliest of the actual events had allegedly occurred nearly 20 years previously), and 
no witness, document or other evidence was lost. The applicant could not be precise about the dates on 
which the alleged acts occurred, but there was unlikely to be any dispute about the facts of visits by the 
applicant to the defendant’s property. The applicant’s action would therefore ‘depend on the view that the 
tribunal of fact takes of the truthfulness of each of the parties’: ibid. 
  16 
 
B Carter v Corporation of the Sisters of Mercy of the Diocese of 
Rockhampton  
The applicant in Carter v Corporation of the Sisters of Mercy of the Diocese of 
Rockhampton76 (‘Carter’) was born on 23 March 1960. When two months old 
she was taken into State care and in 1961 she was placed at Neerkol Orphanage, 
a private institution licensed to care for children, run by an order of nuns. 
Between 1961 and 1972 (aged 1–12), the applicant suffered personal injuries 
from numerous incidents of physical and emotional cruelty from the nuns.77 
From the age of five or six, she allegedly suffered numerous incidents of sexual 
assault by a Neerkol employee, including almost daily rape from age seven. In 
August 1968, aged eight, she complained to government employees of physical 
and sexual abuse, but was not believed and was beaten for complaining. Aged 15, 
she fled State care to live on the streets. 
Throughout her life, the applicant suffered numerous adverse influences and 
incidents apart from the alleged sexual abuse suffered as a child, including: being 
placed in State care at 14 months of age; having severe speech impediments; 
enduring regular severe physical assault, emotional cruelty and torture (for 
example, solitary confinement and being tied to a pole); enduring childhood 
emotional neglect; surviving regular forced use of sedative drugs as a child; 
being shifted to a number of foster placements; running away and living on the 
streets as a teenager; becoming pregnant while homeless; experiencing the death, 
in 1977, of her boyfriend who was the father of her first child; enduring the death 
of her youngest child in 1992; enduring a marriage characterised by verbal and 
emotional abuse; and suffering from longstanding alcohol abuse, beginning after 
the death of her boyfriend in 1977. 
In 1997, she learned of others who had suffered abuse at Neerkol. At this point 
she complained to police and on 6 August 1997 she consulted her solicitor 
regarding criminal charges. Her solicitor offered to investigate a civil claim. The 
Neerkol Orphanage nuns wrote the applicant a letter of apology and regret for 
their actions and omissions, and, with the first defendant, agreed on a settlement 
of the claim. This was, therefore, an application for an extension of time to 
proceed against the State of Queensland and the alleged individual perpetrator. 
Despite the nuns’ admissions and settlement, the State of Queensland did not 
admit that the events occurred and claimed that a number of witnesses were 
either dead, unable to be located or very old. The applicant had until 23 March 
1981 to begin proceedings. She instituted proceedings on 27 July 1998 – a gap of 
17 years and nine months from the expiry of the time limit. The claim was in 
negligence against the State of Queensland (so requiring proof of damage), and 
in trespass to the person against the employee. 
 
                                                 
76 [2000] QSC 306 (Unreported, White J, 8 September 2000); aff’d [2001] QCA 335 (Unreported, 
McPherson JA, Muir and Atkinson JJ, 24 August 2001). 
77 The Court of Appeal accepted that at least some of the appellant’s complaints of ill-treatment were 
confirmed by ‘ample evidence’: Carter [2001] QCA 335 (Unreported, McPherson JA, Muir and Atkinson 
JJ, 24 August 2001) [5] (McPherson JA), [46], [77] (Atkinson J). 
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1 Discovery of Material Facts 
The applicant claimed recent knowledge of two material facts of a decisive 
nature that previously were neither known to her nor within her means of 
knowledge. The first was the knowledge that she suffered psychiatric injuries 
(chronic depression, among other things, and PTSD, although the judgments are 
silent about the latter, save for brief mention by the minority judgment). The 
applicant claimed that she only gained this knowledge on 7 October 1998 after 
reading a psychiatrist’s report dated 29 September 1998. The second fact was the 
causal connection between the acts and the personal injury. The applicant said 
that only after reading the report did she appreciate that there was expert 
evidence indicating that the abuse had caused the psychiatric injuries she had 
suffered since leaving Neerkol. She had received psychological and psychiatric 
treatment over many years but, she said, ‘there was never any mention or 
indication of a connection between the abuse [she] suffered and [her] current 
condition’.78 The applicant admitted that she had harboured a hatred for her 
abusers (but did not ever consider that she was entitled to compensation), and, in 
her affidavit, had stated that she became angry and aggressive because of the 
abuse and that this influenced her aggression as a child towards other children. 
Both at first instance and on appeal the applicant failed. 
 
2 Judicial Reasoning at Trial 
At first instance, White J appears to have based her refusal of the application 
on the assumption that the applicant had direct knowledge of the facts necessary 
to commence an action from the time the limitation period started to run, or at 
least to commence proceedings at any time between her marriage at the age of 19 
– White J does not explain her selection of the significance of this point in the 
applicant’s life – and her complaint to police in 1997. Justice White also found 
that there was ‘nothing in the material to suggest that she could not have 
[commenced proceedings between 1978 and 1997 and] she would have been 
advised, had she sought advice, that the damages would be likely to be 
considerable’.79 
It is difficult to discern the key elements of judicial reasoning here. The 
applicant’s mere knowledge of the facts of the abuse seems to underpin the 
finding that she could have brought proceedings before she did. The judgment 
does not appear to be based on a finding that the applicant should have taken 
reasonable steps to ascertain her psychiatric injury before she actually did. The 
fact that there is no discussion or resolution of the reasonable steps issue in the 
judgment supports this conclusion. Justice White reaches her judgment without 
addressing the claim of recent discovery of material facts of a decisive character. 
This is so despite her Honour’s acknowledgement that the psychiatric diagnosis 
was relevant to the extent of the injury. Notwithstanding this acknowledgement, 
White J found that the applicant, if advised, could have brought the claim earlier 
                                                 
78 Carter [2000] QSC 306 (Unreported, White J, 8 September 2000) [12]. 
79 Finally, White J stated that there was no suggestion that she was suffering the effects of the abuse to such 
an extent as to be legally unable to seek appropriate advice: ibid [13]. 
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based on facts she already knew since, if successful, she would have been 
likely to obtain significant damages.  
This finding is problematic. It appears to be somewhat more arguable with 
respect to the assault and battery claim, which is actionable without proof of 
damage – although to bring an action in the 1980s, for example, when 
institutional abuse was unacknowledged in Queensland, would have presented 
arguably insurmountable difficulties. However, the more concerning difficulty 
with this reasoning lies with its application to the negligence claim against the 
State of Queensland, which requires proof of damage. Until obtaining the 
psychiatric diagnosis, all the applicant knew was that the acts had been done to 
her. She did not know that she had psychiatric injuries, nor did she know that 
there was a connection between the abuse and the injuries. Neither of these 
matters is discussed in the judgment. Furthermore, without giving any reasoning 
to justify the finding, White J assumes that the applicant would have had good 
prospects of success in a claim against the State, at any time between 1978 and 
1997, without knowledge of the psychiatric injury, without knowledge of the 
causal connection between the abuse and the injury (which was unknown to the 
psychiatric community until at least the late 1980s), and before revelations and 
evidence of institutional abuse existed in Queensland. This is a highly dubious 
assumption.  
Furthermore, in Woodhead v Elbourne (an assault and battery action), White J 
held that the psychiatric diagnosis raised the prospect of success from a mere 
possibility to a real likelihood, but this finding was not made in Carter. It is 
unclear what could distinguish these cases in this respect. Until gaining the 
material facts of the psychiatric diagnosis and of the causal connection between 
the abuse and the injury, the applicant in Carter had little evidence on which she 
could commence proceedings, and even less on which she could prove precise 
damage. 
It is similarly difficult to reconcile these two cases on the issue of discovery of 
material facts. In Woodhead v Elbourne, White J found that the applicant did not 
have all necessary facts on which to commence proceedings until gaining the 
psychiatric diagnosis and the evidence of the causal link, yet the applicant in 
Carter was found to have all the necessary facts on which to bring an action 
without these same pieces of evidence. Neither applicant previously possessed 
the psychiatric diagnosis or the evidence of causal connection. The applicant in 
Woodhead v Elbourne had attended regular counselling for two years, and had 
received suggestions that the abuse could cause her injuries. The applicant in 
Carter had attended intermittent psychological and psychiatric counselling, but 
had endured multiple severe adverse influences in her life, and it had never been 
suggested to her that her sexual abuse may have produced her injuries. A related 
irreconcilable matter is that in Carter, there was no consideration given to the 
capacity of the psychiatric report to have the same disentangling effect as her 
Honour found in Woodhead v Elbourne. This is curious, since the applicant in 
Woodhead v Elbourne endured far less severe abuse, and had far fewer and less 
severe adverse influences in her life, than did the applicant in Carter. 
Evidence of PTSD and avoidance was not referred to in the judgment. 
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3 Judicial Reasoning on Appeal  
On appeal, the appellant had to show that the finding that the material facts 
were within her means of knowledge before reading the psychiatric report in 
October 1998 was not reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence presented. 
The majority (McPherson JA, with whom Muir J generally agreed) made several 
conclusions about direct knowledge, and about the taking of reasonable steps to 
ascertain material facts, before dismissing the appeal.80  
First, regarding whether the appellant knew that she suffered from depression, 
McPherson JA held that before reading the psychiatric diagnosis of depression, 
the appellant ‘was aware that she suffered from a depressed condition’81 because 
when she consulted the psychiatrist she reported that at times she felt depressed 
and she drank alcohol to ease this depression. This appears to indicate that, for 
McPherson JA, the fact that the appellant stated that she was, in lay terms, 
‘depressed’ equated with knowledge that she had depression in a psychiatric 
sense. This finding seems unjustifiable. Knowing that you have depression in a 
medical sense requires knowledge of the clinical symptoms of depression, and 
diagnosis of your exhibition of those symptoms. There is substantial authority for 
the principle that knowledge of symptoms is not knowledge of the injury, 
sufficient to make time run, until the nature and extent of the injury is ascertained 
by expert diagnosis.82 The appellant clearly did not know that she suffered 
depression, or, for that matter, any of her other psychiatric injuries, until she 
received the psychiatric diagnosis. 
Second, regarding whether the appellant knew that her injuries were caused by 
her abuse, McPherson JA refers to the appellant’s statement that because of the 
abuse she suffered, she became an aggressive and angry person, and would 
assault other children. From this statement McPherson JA concludes that ‘even at 
that early stage of her life, she was herself able to make a connection between her 
treatment at Neerkol and her mental state or behavioural condition’.83 Justice 
Muir made a similar finding.84 This conclusion also appears to be unjustifiable. 
The psychiatric report itself states that ‘[i]t is difficult to know if the applicant’s 
violence towards others at a young age is in direct relation to her experiences of 
abuse and her own attempts to cope with the abuse’.85 Any one or more of 
several adverse influences in her life until that point could have caused her early 
aggression, including the fact of being placed in State care, her speech 
impediment and its consequences, her forced drug use, her physical abuse, her 
emotional neglect, and her sexual abuse. The appellant could not make her own 
psychiatric diagnosis as she was not an expert witness. The disentangling effect 
of a psychiatric diagnosis and opinion about causal factors referred to in 
                                                 
80 Both at first instance and in the Court of Appeal by majority, it was held that the long delay produced 
sufficient prejudice to the State of Queensland to enliven the discretion to refuse the application as well. 
Curiously, White J would not have barred the proceedings regarding the fourth defendant (the employee 
alleged to have committed the rapes) by the exercise of discretion regarding fair trial: ibid [18]–[22]. 
81 Carter [2001] QCA 335 (Unreported, McPherson JA, Muir and Atkinson JJ, 24 August 2001) [12]. 
82 Commonwealth v Dinnison (1995) 129 ALR 239, 251–2; Donnelly v Victoria (Unreported, Supreme 
Court of Victoria, O’Bryan J, 30 June 1994). 
83 Carter [2001] QCA 335 (Unreported, McPherson JA, Muir and Atkinson JJ, 24 August 2001) [15]. 
84 See ibid [27] ff. 
85 Carter [2000] QSC 306 (Unreported, White J, 8 September 2000) [14]. 
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Woodhead v Elbourne, if appropriate there, is surely appropriate here, since the 
number and severity of the appellant’s adverse influences are greater. 
Third, regarding whether the appellant knew as an adult of the causal 
connection between her childhood suffering and her psychiatric injuries, 
McPherson JA found that she could or should have discovered this by acting 
‘reasonably’:  
If later in her life she did not appreciate that there was a connection between her 
childhood treatment and the alcoholism and her chronic depression, [these were 
facts] which she could have found out by taking the reasonable step of asking any 
psychiatrist whom she consulted. She was aware of her need to consult 
psychiatrists and psychologists because she had done so evidently more than once 
before … [in] August 1998. 
It is true that she says that, before then, there was never any mention of a 
connection between the abuse suffered and her current condition; but it would have 
been a reasonable step for her on the occasion of those consultations for her to ask 
what caused her recurring states of depression.86  
Then, McPherson JA states that the question is not whether there is any expert 
evidence of her injury and the connection before that date, but whether the 
appellant realised the possible connection between the two, or had taken 
reasonable steps to find out if a connection existed. His Honour concludes, in this 
regard, that ‘one would have expected her to ask what it was that caused the 
depressive states’.87 
These findings appear to be made in ignorance of the appellant’s psychiatric 
and emotional circumstances. The appellant cannot be judged to have had direct 
knowledge of the causal link between her childhood sexual abuse and her injuries 
including alcoholism, depression and PTSD as an adult. The most obvious reason 
is that until the late 1980s, no medical specialist in Australia – let alone any lay 
person – knew of the causal connection between childhood sexual abuse and 
psychiatric injury as a child or an adult. Even when this knowledge became 
known to the medical profession (which is not to say it was known generally), 
there were any number of the appellant’s adverse influences that alone, or in 
combination, could have produced these injuries. It is submitted that this matter 
of her knowledge of the causal connection between childhood abuse and adult 
injury is a moot point in any event, since she did not know of her psychiatric 
injuries until receiving the diagnosis. 
The problem with the reasoning in this case is that, in fact, it is not reasoned, 
but more closely resembles mere opinion. Statements such as ‘one would have 
expected her to ask what it was that caused the depressive states’ are not 
supported by an analysis of psychiatric or psychological evidence, or 
substantiated by detailed reference to the psychiatric reports or by reference to 
the multitude of adverse influences in the applicant’s life. Such statements, rather 
than being justifiable conclusions made after an exposition of the grounds 
underpinning them, instead beg necessary questions such as ‘why would one 
expect her to ask what caused the depressive states?’ and ‘when could one 
reasonably expect her to ask what caused the depressive states?’. The answers to 
                                                 
86 Carter [2001] QCA 335 (Unreported, McPherson JA, Muir and Atkinson JJ, 24 August 2001) [15]. 
87 Ibid [16]. 
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these questions can only be arrived at after adequate analysis of psychiatric 
evidence, of the psychiatric reports in the case, and of the appellant’s testimony. 
Later in this article I will draw some conclusions about when the legal system 
may reasonably expect plaintiffs in this context to institute legal proceedings. At 
this stage, I will make two points about the issue of ‘reasonable steps’ to discover 
the injury and the causal connection between the abuse and injury. First, it is 
clearly unjustifiable to require such an investigation by the survivor before the 
medical evidence of the consequences of child sexual abuse was broadly known 
by Australian practitioners. This makes it impossible to find that an adult 
survivor of child abuse should have taken steps to discover the nature, extent and 
cause of their injury before the 1990s, and certainly before the late 1980s. 
Second, in determining what constitutes ‘reasonable steps’, at least where the 
survivor has PTSD, the avoidance symptom must be a necessary consideration. 
In Carter, the expectation of reasonable conduct was decided in ignorance of the 
effects of PTSD, including avoidance. This imposes an unjustifiable strictness on 
the standard of ‘reasonable steps’. 
 
C Applications 861 and 864 of 2001  
The applicant (S) in Applications 861 and 864 of 200188 (‘Application 864’) 
was born on 31 August 1955. She suffered sexual assaults between October 1963 
and July 1965 (aged 8–10), inflicted by the respondent schoolteacher, who later 
became a member of parliament, and who was found guilty of child sexual 
offences involving this applicant by a criminal court.89 The assaults were of a 
very severe nature,90 and included multiple acts of penetrative intercourse. Under 
the law at the time, the applicant had until 1 March 1978 to begin proceedings. 
The applicant made a complaint to police on 28 September 1998 and disclosed 
the sexual abuse of her by the defendant. After the respondent was criminally 
convicted on 1 November 2000, the applicant first thought about bringing civil 
proceedings. She was contacted by a solicitor and decided to proceed. On the 
solicitor’s advice she consulted a psychiatrist on 27 December 2000, and there, 
for the first time, disclosed to a medical specialist her treatment by the 
respondent. She had experienced several adverse life experiences and had sought 
help from doctors, but had not previously disclosed the abuse to a doctor. The 
applicant learned of her psychiatric diagnosis, which included PTSD, in early 
2001, and instituted proceedings for negligence and assault on 27 February 2001 
– a gap of 22 years and 11 months from the expiry of the time limit. She agreed 
in evidence that in the last ten years she had heard of cases where people had 
been sued for sexually abusing children and had been held liable. 
                                                 
88 Unreported, District Court of Queensland, Botting J, 21 June 2002. Two applications were dealt with 
together in this judgment; the application discussed here is that of Applicant S, since she suffered from 
PTSD while the other applicant did not. 
89 Bill D’Arcy, a former schoolteacher and Member of Parliament, was convicted on 1 November 2000 of 
11 counts of indecently dealing with a girl under 12, 4 counts of indecently dealing with a boy under 14, 
and 3 counts of rape. On 17 November 2000, he was sentenced to concurrent gaol terms of between 3 and 
14 years. His appeal against conviction was dismissed but appeals regarding the sentence were allowed to 
the extent that three of the terms of imprisonment were reduced to 10 years: R v D’Arcy [2001] QCA 325 
(Unreported, McMurdo P, McPherson JA and Chesterman J, 11 October 2001). 
90 Using Browne’s table: Brown and Herbert, above n 69. 
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1 Discovery of Material Facts  
(a) Criminal Conviction 
The applicant claimed that the criminal conviction constituted a material fact 
of a decisive character, and Botting J accepted this on the basis that the 
conviction went to proving the tortious acts, and was therefore relevant to the 
action’s reasonable prospect of success.91 Significantly, and unlike as in Carter, 
the Court accepted that had the applicant obtained legal advice prior to the 
convictions, she would have been told that it was unwise to proceed since her 
case was unlikely to succeed without corroborative evidence or fresh complaint, 
especially against a person of such good repute. The fact of the convictions was 
obviously not within the applicant’s means of knowledge until they occurred, so 
the reasonable steps argument could not be raised in this respect. 
 
(b) Diagnosis of PTSD 
For present purposes, the notable part of this case concerns the applicant’s 
psychiatric diagnosis. The applicant had seen a psychiatrist in late 2000 and for 
the first time had divulged the abuse to a medical specialist. The psychiatrist’s 
report stated that as a result of the abuse, S had moderately severe PTSD, as well 
as other conditions. The second material fact relied on was, therefore, her 
discovery in early 2001 of her psychiatric diagnosis of PTSD: the nature and 
extent of her injury. Before contacting police on 28 September 1998, the 
applicant had not disclosed the sexual assaults for several reasons, including 
feelings of guilt, shame and self-blame, and because ‘to tell someone else meant 
[she] would have had to describe what had occurred to [her] out aloud and, until 
[she] gave [her] statement to the police, [she] could not bring [herself] to do that 
as it meant reliving the events’.92 
 
2 Judicial Reasoning 
The application was refused,93 but Botting J did not find that these facts were 
not material. Nor did he find that they were not decisive. Nor did he find that the 
applicant had direct knowledge of sufficient facts to institute proceedings before 
she did. 
The judgment turned on the finding that these facts were not beyond S’s 
means of knowledge, because by taking reasonable steps the applicant would 
have discovered the facts about her psychiatric injuries. Demonstrating a certain 
                                                 
91 Application 864 (Unreported, District Court of Queensland, Botting J, 21 June 2002) 33–4. See also 
Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 79. 
92 Application 864 (Unreported, District Court of Queensland, Botting J, 21 June 2002) 11–12. 
93 The defendant accepted that he had been found guilty of crimes but denied that he had committed the 
acts, and asserted that undue prejudice would be caused to him in the civil action because of the long 
delay. The Court accepted that, despite the criminal convictions on a higher standard of proof, which 
facilitated proof of the applicant’s civil action, prejudice was caused by the long delay, and the extension 
was refused. This remarkable result prompted Botting J to concede that in cases such as this, ‘[i]t may 
perhaps trouble some that … our legal system should deny the complainants the right to pursue their 
violator for compensation by civil action’. However, he went on to say: ‘It is not my function to seek to 
explain, let alone seek to resolve any such apparent incongruity. My task is to apply the law as I 
understand it to the facts as I find them’: ibid 49. 
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degree of awareness of the position of adult survivors of child abuse, albeit not 
informed by psychiatric evidence – there is still no explicit discussion of PTSD 
and avoidance – Botting J accepted that ‘often child victims of sexual abuse will 
find it very hard, if not impossible, to tell others of their experiences [and] that 
when such a victim becomes an adult, it will continue to be extremely difficult 
for such a person to tell a doctor of the abuse’.94 
However, this did not lead to a finding that for a person with PTSD, taking 
‘reasonable steps’ meant taking those steps when the person felt ready to do so. 
Justice Botting asserted that by the early 1990s there was a general societal 
awareness of child sexual abuse and generally held medical knowledge about the 
consequences of child sexual abuse. His Honour referred to the applicant’s 
awareness since the early 1990s of numerous health problems, and to her action 
in seeking medical help regarding them. His Honour also gave weight to the fact 
that she had made a complaint on 28 September 1998 to police, and to her 
testimony that she had heard of cases where people had been held civilly liable 
for child sexual abuse. From these findings, Botting J concluded that ‘[w]hilst 
one can understand her reluctance to raise such matters with her advisors, it 
seems to me that by the mid-1990s her failure to do so was not reasonable’.95 
The conclusion about what steps should reasonably be taken, by someone 
suffering from PTSD, to ascertain knowledge of their injuries is made without 
guidance from the symptomatology of PTSD, and in particular, without reference 
to the PTSD sufferer’s avoidance of stimuli associated with the traumatic events 
– a process explicitly described by the applicant.96 Moreover, even if the 
applicant had have taken ‘reasonable steps’ and been diagnosed in the mid-
1990s, and had then sought legal advice, Botting J himself accepted (when 
considering the effect of the criminal conviction) that she would have been 
discouraged from proceeding by legal advisors because there was a high 
probability of failure in the absence of a criminal conviction. The reasoning is 
therefore illogical. If the applicant had instituted proceedings in the mid-1990s 
she would have been discouraged from proceeding by legal advisors; and if she 
had proceeded, she would almost certainly have failed, both in gaining an 
extension of time, and in proving liability on the balance of probabilities. Yet, 
now that she has instituted proceedings in 2001, informed by two decisive 
material facts, she is still bound to fail. On the reasoning of Botting J, at whatever 
time in her life the applicant instituted proceedings, she would have been unable 
to gain access to the civil litigation process. 
 
D Hopkins v Queensland  
The applicant in Hopkins v Queensland97 was born on 10 November 1974. She 
allegedly suffered physical, sexual and emotional abuse from December 1984 to 
October 1987, the sexual abuse allegedly beginning on 10 November 1985 (aged 
11), inflicted by her foster father, with whose family she had been placed in 
December 1984. The judgment does not describe the abuse alleged, so it is 
                                                 
94 Ibid 36. 
95 Ibid. 
96 See above n 92 and accompanying text. 
97 [2004] QDC 021 (Unreported, McGill J, 24 February 2004). 
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impossible to estimate its severity. The applicant had until 10 November 1995 
to begin proceedings. She instituted proceedings on 24 July 2003, after learning 
of her psychiatric diagnosis of PTSD and borderline personality disorder by 
reading a psychiatric report dated 19 June 2003, and after receiving her 
departmental file on 25 July 2002 – a gap of seven years and eight months from 
the expiry of the time limit. 
The application was to extend time to allow a claim in damages for negligence 
or breach of statutory duty against the State of Queensland regarding acts and 
omissions of officers of the Children’s Services Department. The claim was that 
the applicant suffered psychiatric illness because of the abuse and that this would 
have been avoided or reduced if she had been removed from the family when she 
first complained of physical abuse in late 1986. Complaints of sexual abuse 
appear to have been made to neighbours and the Department earlier in 1986, but 
nothing eventuated from these: the applicant said that the officer did not believe 
the claim and forced her to apologise to the foster parents for telling lies. She was 
removed from foster care in late 1987. The applicant’s two sisters remained with 
the foster family until 1989, when they complained about sexual abuse by the 
foster father. At this time, the applicant was asked if she had ever been sexually 
abused by him and she said this had not occurred, but that she had been 
physically abused. The Court accepted that this statement was ‘consistent with 
her later attitude of not wanting to think about the issue, or do anything to revive 
her memories of it.’98 
In early 2002, one of the applicant’s sisters and the foster father’s own 
daughter complained to police of physical and sexual abuse by the foster father. 
The applicant then made a complaint to police in May 2002. It was suggested 
that she obtain her departmental file and see a lawyer. The applicant obtained her 
file in July 2002 and instructed solicitors on 11 September 2002 to investigate a 
claim. Before speaking to the police officer on 11 May 2002, the applicant had 
not disclosed the sexual abuse. She felt no-one would believe her because she 
had previously been told that she was lying. She had tried to block out all 
thoughts of the abuse and get on with her life. She found it difficult to think 
about the abuse, let alone talk about it. Since the abuse, she had experienced 
severe depression, was distrustful of people, had nightmares, was quick to anger, 
was excessively sensitive in relationships, had difficulty maintaining 
relationships, and had flashbacks triggered by events that reminded her of the 
abuse. She had not seen a psychiatrist or psychologist before being referred to a 
psychiatrist in June 2003 by her solicitors for the purpose of getting a psychiatric 
report.99 
 
                                                 
98 Ibid [15]. 
99 Ibid [17]–[18]. 
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1 Discovery of Material Facts 
The psychiatric report of June 2003 diagnosed PTSD, which the applicant had 
continually suffered from since her abuse.100 The report said that the applicant 
would have been aware of the symptoms she was suffering, and because of 
flashbacks involving the traumatic events she would have been aware of the 
connection between the symptoms and the traumatic events. The report said that 
a patient in the applicant’s position was aware that she was trying to avoid being 
reminded of the traumatic events, but that this desire was driven by anxiety and 
depressed moods when she has the reliving experiences – hence the desire to 
avoid confronting the issue was a product of the psychiatric condition.101 
 
2 Judicial Reasoning  
Using similar reasoning to that used by both courts in Carter, McGill J held 
that the psychiatric diagnosis was not a material fact of a decisive character. This 
decision primarily turned on the finding that, before she discovered her 
diagnosis, the applicant knew all the relevant facts about her psychiatric injury 
and its causal link to the Department’s failure to remove her before it did. The 
decision was, therefore, premised on knowledge already possessed by the 
applicant. The reasonable steps argument, used in Application 864 and relied on 
as a secondary reason in Carter, was not raised here. 
 
(a) Knowledge of Symptoms and Causal Connection 
The decisive finding by McGill J was that  
what matters is whether the applicant is aware of her symptoms, not whether she is 
aware of the particular psychiatric condition that they represent, and whether [the 
applicant] connects those symptoms with the relevant incident in the past, or 
whether that connection is only ascertained with the benefit of expert medical 
advice.102  
Here, McGill J held that the applicant was aware of her symptoms, simply 
because of the fact of suffering them, and because she avoided stimuli associated 
with the abuse.103 
Like the findings in Carter, this decision is problematic because the applicant 
did not know that her symptoms were those of a psychiatric condition, and the 
judgment does not demonstrate the contrary. The applicant was simply aware of 
her feelings, her memories of the abuse, and her ways of behaving. In a lay sense, 
this knowledge of symptoms does not amount to knowledge of a psychiatric 
condition or of the extent of it. In a legal sense, by 2004 there was even more 
                                                 
100 The report stated that the psychological trauma she suffered would have been greatly reduced if she had 
been removed when she complained about abuse in 1986. After this she developed severe anger and 
behavioural problems, and her personality difficulties escalated. The failure to remove her then increased 
her prospects of developing PTSD and personality disorder, and promoted her feelings of isolation, 
depression and emotional instability, which became severe and ongoing. 
101 The applicant also relied on her discovery of her departmental file on 25 July 2002 as a decisive material 
fact, but this was also rejected. She claimed that only after access to the file did she become aware that 
departmental employees, responsible for her placement, had information in October 1986 which ought to 
have caused them to remove her from the family. 
102 Hopkins v Queensland [2004] QDC 021 (Unreported, McGill J, 24 February 2004) [32]. 
103 Ibid [17]–[18], [33]. 
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authority for the principle that knowledge of symptoms is not knowledge of the 
injury, sufficient to make time run, until the nature and extent of the injury is 
ascertained by expert diagnosis.104 Nor is this knowledge sufficient to enliven 
any demand that reasonable steps be taken to find out the exact nature of the 
injury.105 The applicant, therefore, should not have been deemed to have 
knowledge of the existence of either the nature or extent of her psychiatric 
conditions. 
The applicant was also held to be aware of the causal connection between the 
abuse and these symptoms and, by extension, of their relationship to the 
department’s failure to remove her.106 Without referring to any evidence, McGill 
J concluded that sufferers of PTSD will always be aware of the particular trauma 
producing their symptoms and that, because of this, the sufferers’ responses will 
always be identified by the sufferer as an ‘obviously unnatural condition which 
was caused by that [traumatic] event’.107 This is problematic because it expects 
psychiatric diagnosis by a person with no medical expertise. What may be 
diagnosed by a psychiatrist as a product of abuse, and an unnatural condition, 
may appear to the lay victim as an ordinary result of their life. In addition, the 
avoidance criterion means that most sufferers of PTSD will likely not spend their 
time rationally pondering the causal connections between the traumatic events of 
their life and their current problems. 
Even if Justice McGill’s conclusion is accurate, made in reliance on the nature 
of PTSD, the reasoning in this decision is still questionable. Even if the applicant 
knew of the fact of her symptoms, and knew that her feelings and ways of 
behaving were a causal consequence of her abuse, this is not the same as 
knowing that she had a psychiatric disorder resulting from those events. The 
reasoning simply does not prove that, before reading the psychiatric report, she 
knew the precise nature or extent of her injury. 
 
(b) Nature and Extent of Injury, and Reasonable Prospect of Success 
The psychiatric diagnosis in Woodhead v Elbourne was held to raise the 
prospect of success from a mere possibility to a real likelihood; this was why it 
was a material fact of a decisive character. Before that diagnosis, there was no 
medical evidence of injury. This conclusion followed the reasoning in Sugden v 
Crawford. An action instituted without medical proof of the condition suffered as 
a consequence of the event, particularly where the claimed injury may be 
received with scepticism – as psychological injuries produced by child abuse 
may well be108 – seems to be exactly the sort of case that legal advisors 
discourage before obtaining a diagnosis of the precise injury. 
For McGill J, the diagnosis of PTSD was not a material fact of a decisive 
character. His Honour reached this conclusion without reference to the 
                                                 
104 Commonwealth v Dinnison (1995) 129 ALR 239; Donnelly v Victoria (Unreported, Supreme Court of 
Victoria, O’Bryan J, 30 June 1994). See also SD v Director-General of Community Welfare Services (Vic) 
(2001) 27 Fam LR 695, 704. 
105 Calder v Uzelac [2003] VSCA 175 (Unreported, Ashley AJA, Buchanan and Chernov JJA, 14 November 
2003) [10] (Buchanan JA); S v G [1995] 3 NZLR 681, 687. 
106 Hopkins v Queensland [2004] QDC 021 (Unreported, McGill J, 24 February 2004) [34], [38]. 
107 Ibid [38]. 
108 Tiernan v Tiernan (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Byrne J, 22 April 1993) 4. 
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definitions of ‘material fact’ and ‘decisive character’. The justification for this 
conclusion was that what mattered was the applicant’s awareness of her 
symptoms; her ignorance of the medical condition from which she suffered was 
irrelevant. The condition of PTSD was held to be simply the technical label for 
the symptoms that she was aware of:  
Her condition of PTSD is simply a diagnostic label attached to a particular 
collection of unpleasant consequences to her of the particular traumatic events in 
her past … A person suffering symptoms of PTSD may well not know that that 
collection of symptoms is appropriately described in technical terms by that 
particular label, but will certainly know that those symptoms are present.109  
The applicant’s ignorance of the severity of her condition, and of her 
prognosis, was held to be irrelevant as these facts only enlarged the damages. 
But even if the plaintiff was aware of her symptoms, and even of the causal 
link between her symptoms and her abuse, surely the diagnosis of PTSD defined 
the true nature and extent of her personal injury. Until obtaining that diagnosis, 
all she knew was that she had these feelings and behaviours, and, possibly, that 
some or all of them were caused by the sexual abuse inflicted on her. Would she 
really bring legal action based on such little knowledge? Before the injuries were 
revealed by the psychiatric report, would legal advisors have recommended 
instituting proceedings without knowledge of the exact nature and extent of her 
injuries? 
The reasoning of McGill J appears contrived. In this class of case, medical 
diagnosis of the exact injury is usually treated as a material fact of a decisive 
character, as in Woodhead v Elbourne, Carter and Application 864. It is a 
‘material fact’ because it is relevant to the nature and extent of the personal 
injury caused, and it is of a ‘decisive character’ since a reasonable person 
knowing of the diagnosis would regard it as evincing a right of action with a 
reasonable prospect of success and of an award of damages sufficient to justify 
bringing the action (whereas the survivor’s mere knowledge that he or she is 
depressed, anxious and has nightmares would not be so regarded). The 
conventional approach, exemplified by Carter and Application 864, is not to 
deny the diagnosis of PTSD being material and decisive, but to argue that the 
applicant had not taken reasonable steps to obtain that diagnosis. This is the 
terrain on which the argument should have proceeded. 
 
(c) Disentangling 
Because the applicant in this case was found to know of the causal connection 
between her abuse and her injury, McGill J distinguished this case from 
Woodhead v Elbourne, where White J held that the psychiatric diagnosis 
disentangled the applicant’s adverse life influences and their consequences. In 
Hopkins v Queensland, despite the applicant having PTSD, and despite evidence 
of other incidents in the applicant’s life of arguably more gravity than those of 
                                                 
109 Hopkins v Queensland [2004] QDC 021 (Unreported, McGill J, 24 February 2004) [38]. 
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the applicant in Woodhead v Elbourne,110 the possibility that the psychiatric 
report had this same disentangling effect was not considered. If the argument was 
relevant in Woodhead v Elbourne, why was it not discussed here?  
In Woodhead v Elbourne, the applicant had spent two years in regular 
psychological counselling exploring the assaults (and so was aware of her 
symptoms and, on Justice McGill’s reasoning concerning PTSD, of the causal 
connection), yet this was held to be insufficient to deny the extension. If there 
was justification for the disentangling argument in Woodhead v Elbourne – with 
that applicant’s PTSD, comparatively minor sexual abuse and relatively normal 
home life – then when compared with the situation of the applicant in Hopkins v 
Queensland – with the same diagnosis of PTSD, arguably more severe abuse, and 
a less stable home life – there is a strong case for the same argument to be made. 
 
V EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL REASONING 
The decision in Woodhead v Elbourne stands out from the other three cases. 
The applicant was suing for assault and battery (actionable without proof of 
damage). She suffered minor abuse, had PTSD and received extensive 
counselling, and had three identified minor adverse life influences, but was 
deemed not to have sufficient knowledge of the material facts to proceed until 
receiving the psychiatric diagnosis. The reasonable steps argument was not 
raised. In Carter, the applicant was suing for negligence (requiring proof of 
damage). She suffered very severe abuse, had PTSD and received intermittent 
counselling, and had multiple adverse life influences. She was deemed to have 
knowledge of the injuries and the causal connection, and if not, it was decided 
that she should have taken reasonable steps to find out the nature, extent and 
cause of her injury before she did. In Application 864, the applicant was suing for 
negligence and for assault. She suffered very severe abuse, had PTSD, and had 
several adverse life influences. She was denied the application, not on the basis 
of knowledge already possessed, nor on the basis that the diagnosis was neither 
material nor decisive, but on the basis that she had not taken reasonable steps to 
ascertain her diagnosis before she did. In Hopkins v Queensland, the applicant 
was suing for negligence. Her precise sexual abuse was not identified by the 
judgment. She had PTSD and had multiple adverse life influences. She was 
deemed by the Court to be aware of her symptoms and their cause, and this 
finding was used to justify the conclusion that she had sufficient knowledge on 
which to institute proceedings before she knew of the psychiatric diagnosis. 
 
                                                 
110 The applicant in Hopkins v Queensland had experienced behaviour problems even before being placed 
with the foster parents. She had been diagnosed with epilepsy in 1982, aged seven, and she had taken an 
overdose of epilepsy tablets in January 1983 resulting in a massive fit requiring hospitalisation. As well, 
there was the fact itself of being a child requiring foster care (the reasons behind this are nowhere 
elaborated). In 1994, the applicant had seen a social worker for counselling about a drug overdose 
prompted by a custody dispute over her eight month old child. When considering the exercise of 
discretion, McGill J indicates that many other experiences in the applicant’s life were likely sources of 
psychological consequences: ibid [81]. 
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A Knowledge of Symptoms 
The decisions based on the applicants’ deemed knowledge – Carter at first 
instance, and Hopkins v Queensland – do not seem to be justifiable. An 
applicant’s mere awareness that she has been abused, and even her awareness, in 
lay terms, of the symptoms (‘I have flashbacks, I avoid thinking and talking 
about my abuse, I avoid things that will remind me of the abuse’), should not be 
sufficient to cause the application to fail and deny access to the courts. Even if an 
applicant is deemed to be aware of the causal connection between her perceived 
symptoms and the abuse, this should not be considered direct knowledge of 
material facts sufficient to deny the application. 
The reason for this, despite the finding of White J to the contrary in Carter at 
first instance, is that in these cases, without knowledge of the exact psychiatric 
injury and its extent, it is unlikely that an action would have a reasonable 
prospect of success, or result in an award of damages sufficient to commence 
proceedings. Under the principle in Sugden v Crawford, adopted in Woodhead v 
Elbourne, the psychiatric diagnosis raises the prospect of success from a mere 
possibility to a real likelihood. This is especially so in claims for negligence 
where proof of injury is required. Without diagnosis of the injuries, where is the 
proof of damage that creates a reasonable prospect of success, and the promise of 
sufficient damages to risk the economic and personal costs of litigation? Mere 
grief, distress, fear or anxiety is insufficient to be actionable damage if it does not 
amount to psychiatric illness.111 As with Sugden v Crawford, without medical 
evidence, claimed injury in these cases is likely to be met with scepticism, and 
will be unlikely to produce damages sufficient to justify legal proceedings. 
Claims brought before the late 1990s would have faced the added difficulty of 
proving liability in a social context where institutional child abuse was 
undisclosed, and even successful claims for individual child abuse were rare and 
not widely known. 
In contrast, an applicant who knows of her abuse and its causal consequences, 
and who knows of her exact injury (and who is psychologically capable of 
initiating and withstanding legal proceedings), should not receive an extension of 
time one year after possessing all that knowledge. If this reasoning is accepted, 
the next question becomes: when is it reasonable to expect survivors of child 
sexual abuse to take reasonable steps to gain this knowledge? 
 
B Taking Reasonable Steps to Ascertain Material Facts 
In Pizer v Ansett Australia, Thomas JA stated that there is no requirement to 
take appropriate advice or to ask appropriate questions ‘if in all the circumstances 
it would not be reasonable to expect a reasonable person in the shoes of the 
plaintiff to have done so’.112 Is it reasonable to expect an adult survivor of child 
sexual abuse who has PTSD to take steps to ascertain the nature, extent and cause 
of their injury? Is it reasonable to expect this given that, in the post-1990s era, 
                                                 
111 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317, 338 (Gaudron J), 382 (Gummow and Kirby JJ), 414–15 
(Hayne J); Wilson v Horne (1999) 8 Tas R 363; Hicks v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 
2 All ER 56. 
112 Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Court of Appeal, Pincus and Thomas JJA, and Byrne J, 29 
September 1998, [18]. 
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there is broader medical recognition of the consequences of child sexual abuse, 
broader social recognition of the phenomenon of child sexual abuse, and more 
common knowledge that perpetrators of abuse have been found civilly liable to 
their victims? Or should the avoidance symptom of PTSD mean that there should 
not be a standard of reasonable steps imposed, and that each survivor should be 
able to take those steps when he or she feels individually able to do so? 
The avoidance criterion of PTSD underpins an argument that, when it comes 
to discovering material facts and commencing litigation, at the very least, the 
survivor of child sexual abuse who has PTSD cannot justifiably be held to the 
standard of reasonable behaviour expected of individuals who are not victims of 
such abuse and who do not suffer from the condition. The avoidance criterion 
must be part of any reasoned deliberation about what can reasonably be expected 
of a plaintiff in this context. 
None of the judgments in the case studies discusses the symptomatology of 
PTSD, or the avoidance criterion, in detail. The judicial determinations of what is 
reasonable for a survivor of child sexual abuse with PTSD are either uninformed 
by psychological evidence, or are inadequately informed, with insufficient 
examination of the psychiatric literature and of the psychiatric reports presented 
in the case. Those that turn wholly, or partly, on the reasonable steps issue – 
Application 864 and Carter on appeal – do not consider this evidence when 
determining what the applicants in those circumstances should reasonably have 
done. Justice Botting makes a partial acknowledgment of the applicant’s 
difficulty in discussing the abuse, but does not refer to medical literature or the 
applicant’s psychiatric reports in detail, and reaches a conclusion that imposes an 
unreasonable demand upon the applicant. Justice McGill, in an aside, accepts that 
the avoidance symptom (analysed not as a psychiatric symptom but in a lay 
sense) may be relevant to a judgment about whether it is reasonable for an 
applicant to seek advice,113 but this is deemed to be an irrelevant issue. Justice 
McGill also comments that  
the effect of the reluctance to talk or think about the events’ is not accommodated 
by the extension provision: the provision is not concerned with the situation where 
an applicant who was in possession of the important facts simply did not want to 
pursue the matter, for whatever reason. I do not think that the situation is changed 
by the fact that the desire not to pursue the issue is in a sense caused by the 
psychiatric injury itself … any understandable reluctance of the plaintiff to pursue 
this matter earlier because of her psychiatric state is not a factor which can be taken 
into account.114 
A distinction needs to be drawn between whether it would be possible for a 
plaintiff to ascertain the nature, extent and cause of an injury, if the plaintiff were 
able to consult appropriate experts, and whether a person in the plaintiff’s 
position could reasonably be expected to take steps to ascertain those things. Due 
to the avoidance criterion of PTSD, it may not be possible for many survivors of 
child sexual abuse to take these steps until they feel ready to do so; this readiness 
will differ among individuals and arguably cannot be reduced to a typical model 
                                                 
113 Hopkins v Queensland [2004] QDC 021 (Unreported, McGill J, 24 February 2004) [44], although his 
Honour seems to contradict this at [42] so it is difficult to discern exactly what the judgment represents. 
114 Ibid [41]–[42]. 
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which enables judgments about what is reasonable. This is a context where, as 
Thomas J states in W v Attorney-General,115 the test should be subjective. 
Having made a disclosure should not automatically disentitle an applicant 
from an extension of time. Such an applicant (for example, the applicant in 
Application 864) may not yet be able to engage in a detailed reliving and 
retelling of the abuse in a receptive atmosphere, let alone in the hostile and 
adversarial atmosphere of the civil litigation arena. It is one thing to make a 
simple report of abuse to a police officer or a doctor; it is quite another to relive 
the full details of the events. In contrast, where a person with PTSD has brought 
other proceedings requiring a reliving of the abuse, this would produce a finding 
against that person’s requested extension if they had not acted within one year of 
being able to bring those proceedings. 
Judgments that recognise the psychiatric evidence have reached more reasoned 
conclusions. In Carter on appeal, apart from the finding of the recent discovery 
of a number of decisive material facts which were relevant to the reasonable 
prospect of success,116 Justice Atkinson’s dissent was primarily motivated by an 
acceptance of psychological evidence and its impact on the survivor’s 
understanding of the acts and their consequences, and on the conduct that could 
reasonably be demanded of the survivor as a reasonable litigator. Her Honour 
referred to research about the psychological effects of childhood sexual abuse, 
and referred to judicial and extra-judicial recognition of the fact that delay in 
making and acting on disclosures of child sexual abuse is a common and 
expected consequence of that abuse. Justice Atkinson concluded that ‘[t]he 
resultant inability of a victim of childhood sexual abuse to recognise the true 
nature of the abuse and the damage caused by it is well documented, as is the 
difficulty for the victim in complaining of the abuse’.117 This reasoning produced 
the finding that, for survivors of child sexual abuse, the cognitive understanding 
of the injury, and the standard of ‘reasonable’ conduct that can justifiably be 
expected, is different from that of plaintiffs who have not been so abused. In the 
applicant’s case: 
While a reasonably well-adjusted, ordinarily self-confident person might be able to 
make the requisite [causal] link and be prepared and able to take civil action for the  
wrongs done to them, typically adults who have survived such abuse are lacking in 
self-esteem and remain powerless. This particularly applies to Ms Carter.118 
Judgments in the New Zealand Court of Appeal regarding negligence claims 
brought by adult survivors of child sexual abuse are similarly notable. In W v 
Attorney-General,119 counsel for the defendant argued that the plaintiff had 
                                                 
115 [1999] 2 NZLR 709, 728. 
116 Carter [2001] QCA 335 (Unreported, McPherson JA, Muir and Atkinson JJ, 24 August 2001) [85]. 
117 Ibid [88]. 
118 Ibid [86]. In addition, Atkinson J refused to accept that public policy reasons justified the operation of the 
delay defence in this context, thinking it ‘plainly unjust’ not to exercise discretion in the applicant’s 
favour: departmental officers were still alive, as were many former residents and staff, and hundreds of 
pages of relevant evidence had been disclosed in this action, together with evidence contained in Forde 
Commission, above n 28. As well, a fiduciary claim needed to be determined based on the same evidence 
as was relevant to the negligence action against the State of Queensland: ibid [93]–[97].  
119 [2003] NZCA 150 (Unreported, Blanchard, Tipping, McGrath, Anderson and Glazebrook JJ, 15 July 
2003). 
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longstanding awareness of her symptoms, and that insufficient weight had been 
given to this when deciding the reasonable discoverability issue: the plaintiff had 
also made an accident compensation claim in 1985. The Court stated that  
what counsel called a description by EW of her symptoms was in fact her memories 
of the abuse. The psychiatric evidence [is] that most child abuse victims will … 
remember the abuse, although they may try (consciously or subconsciously) to blot 
it out from their memory. Counsel’s argument … confused knowledge of the event 
of abuse with knowledge of the link between that event and the dysfunction it is 
causing in the present life of the victim.120 
Informed by the psychiatric evidence, this reasoning and outcome is a stark 
contrast to the knowledge of symptoms argument in Carter and Hopkins v 
Queensland. 
Even if the outcome in Woodhead v Elbourne appears more justifiable than 
that in Carter or Hopkins v Queensland, the reasoning is flawed. Sound 
reasoning for the decision in Woodhead v Elbourne could have developed along 
the following lines: the applicant did not require proof of damage because assault 
and battery is actionable per se. However, because of PTSD and, in particular, 
the avoidance symptom, she could not institute proceedings within time – not 
because she could not take ‘reasonable steps’, before she did, to ascertain her 
damage (which would only have been relevant to a claim in negligence) but 
because she could not institute proceedings that would force her to relate and 
relive her trauma for the purposes of litigation. This reasoning is more properly 
based, not on the reasonable steps argument but on the concept of legal disability. 
It is therefore appropriate to turn briefly to the question of disability. 
 
VI CAN PTSD CONSTITUTE A DISABILITY? 
This article has argued that PTSD prevents a typical adult survivor of child 
sexual abuse from being able to discover the necessary facts on which to bring an 
action and that, even once the individual is in possession of those facts, PTSD 
prevents the institution of legal proceedings until the individual is able to do so. 
The argument has been made in the context of evaluating judicial reasoning 
about the possession of sufficient knowledge and the taking of reasonable steps. 
However, beyond the relevance of PTSD to the reasonable steps issue, the 
above arguments may amount to a claim that PTSD is an incapacity which 
constitutes a legal disability. If, because of his or her psychiatric condition, a 
person cannot ascertain facts necessary to bring litigation, instruct counsel and 
endure the rigours of the litigation process, this should constitute a disability such 
that time does not run until the disability ends. A survivor with PTSD may not 
always be under a disability; if he or she is still able to institute proceedings and 
make decisions about the action, but requires the diagnosis for the purpose of 
ascertaining the nature and extent of the injury, then the reasonable steps issue 
will remain relevant.121 
                                                 
120 Ibid [25]. See also S v A-G [2003] 3 NZLR 450. 
121 See W v A-G [1999] 2 NZLR 709, 728 (Thomas J). Contra Smith v Advanced Electrics [2003] QCA 432 
(Unreported, McMurdo P, Jerrard JA and Fryberg J, 3 October 2003). 
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In Queensland, a person is under a disability if he or she is an infant or of 
‘unsound mind’.122 In King v Coupland,123 Macrossan J interpreted soundness of 
mind as involving, for example, the capacity to properly instruct a solicitor, to 
exercise reasonable judgment on a possible settlement, and to understand the 
nature and extent of any available claim. The lack of such capacities was held to 
be part of a broader concept of mental illness, causing inability to manage affairs 
in relation to the injury in the way that a reasonable person would. A similar 
interpretation is now enshrined in statutory definitions of incapacity in New 
South Wales, Victoria and South Australia.124 Since the effect of incapacity is to 
suspend the running of time, it is quite possible that, if a child is abused and 
sustains sufficient psychological injury to constitute incapacity, then, if the 
condition continues, this could effectively prevent time running even after 
majority. It could even prevent time running in New South Wales and Victoria, 
despite the new provisions requiring a capable parent to bring the action. 
In Smith v Advanced Electrics,125 where the plaintiff electrician suffered burns 
and shock when making electrical repairs, Fryberg J (with whom McMurdo P 
agreed) found that the plaintiff was under a disability due to unsoundness of 
mind, on the basis of psychiatric evidence of PTSD. Fifteen months after the 
event, the plaintiff had instituted proceedings against the owner and occupier of 
the premises in which he was injured, but he had not commenced proceedings 
against his employer. Four years and eight months after the event, the plaintiff 
commenced proceedings against the employer, claiming disability since the date 
of the event. Despite instituting the other proceedings within time, the plaintiff, 
who had been diagnosed with PTSD existing from the date of the event, was 
found to be under a legal disability regarding the action against the defendant 
employer so that time was suspended in relation to that action. 
In Flemming v Gibson,126 where the plaintiff was injured in a car accident, a 
finding of disability was upheld based on psychiatric evidence of the plaintiff’s 
intellectual deficit and social phobia. Therefore, there is no doubt that psychiatric 
conditions including, but not limited to PTSD, can constitute legal disabilities 
sufficient to stop time running. This argument does not yet appear to have been 
made in Queensland in the context of an adult survivor of child sexual abuse who 
has sustained PTSD or some other psychiatric condition. It has, however, been 
used successfully in this context in New Zealand.127 
 
                                                 
122 Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 5(2). 
123 [1981] Qd R 121, 123. 
124 ‘Incapacitated person’ is defined as ‘a person who is incapable of, or substantially impeded in, the 
management of his or her affairs in relation to the cause of action, due to any disease or any impairment 
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VII CONCLUSION 
In Hawkins v Clayton, Deane J stated that  
[i]f a wrongful action … not only causes unlawful injury to another but, while its 
effect remains, effectively precludes that other from bringing proceedings to 
recover the damage to which he is entitled, that other person is doubly injured. 
There can be no acceptable or even sensible justification of a law which provides 
that to sustain the second injury will preclude the recovery of damages for the 
first.128  
The statutory time limit of three years from majority is unjustifiable in child 
sexual abuse cases, at the very least for survivors who have PTSD, because of 
their avoidance of stimuli associated with the traumatic events. Judgments in 
applications to extend time are important because they enable or deny access to 
justice. If extensions are not granted where appropriate, the applicant is ‘doubly 
injured’ and justice miscarries.  
If psychiatric evidence of PTSD and avoidance is not appropriately considered 
by courts in applications to extend time, then unjust results will flow, 
compounding the initial statutory injustice. This argument may also apply to 
evidence of other psychiatric conditions having comparable effects on one’s 
ability to institute proceedings. It is acceptable for the law to take time to 
incorporate advances in knowledge from other disciplines, but it is not acceptable 
to deny access to justice once that evidence is settled. Evidence of PTSD in child 
sexual abuse cases needs no more ripening. It is likely that, throughout Australia, 
more applications to extend time will be made in the wake of the 2004 
Commonwealth Senate inquiry into children in institutional care.129 It is also 
possible that an inquiry in South Australia, if eventuating, will have similar 
results.130 It is time for Australian legislatures and courts to respond appropriately 
in this class of case. 
                                                 
128 (1988) 164 CLR 539, 589–90. 
129 Senate Community Affairs References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Forgotten Australians: A 
Report on Australians Who Experienced Institutional or Out-of-Home Care as Children (2004), <http:// 
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